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INTRODUCTION
A few years ago, the front page of South Africa's leading newspaper
ran a story titled, "Officials stumble upon Jo'burg hospital of horrors."' For
an unknown period of time, individuals without medical training performed
abortions in a dilapidated office building in downtown Johannesburg.2 The
extremely unsanitary conditions of the makeshift clinic shocked health offi-
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Florida Levin College of Law. I would like to thank
Jamie Abrams, Aziza Ahmed, Naomi Cahn, Anne Dellinger, Frances Eberhard, Paul Gugliuzza, Janet
Halley, Daniela Kraiem, Cynthia Lee, Zinaida Miller, Fernanda Nicola, Ashley Riveira, Josephine Ross,
Carol Sanger, and the participants of the fall 2009 and 2010 courses, Gender and the Family in Transna-
tional Law, at Harvard Law School. Many thanks as well to the editors of the Alabama Law Review. A
shorter version of this article appears as the chapter, Challenges for Contemporary Reproductive Rights
Advocacy, in FEMINIST CONSTITUTIONALISM: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES (Beverley Baines et al. eds.,
2011). All errors are mine.
1. Officials stumble upon Jo'burg hospital of horrors, MAIL & GUARDIAN, Jan. 14, 2008,
http://www.mg.co.za/article/2008-01-14-officials-stumble-upon-joburg-hospital-of-horrors.
2. Id.
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cials, as did the discovery that a "steady clientele" used illegal services in a
facility where there was little evidence of the necessary medical equipment
or supplies.3
The news story is disturbing because of the gruesome environment it
describes. But perhaps equally surprising is the context of abortion regula-
tion in South Africa. One might expect to read this newspaper article in a
country that bans abortion, where women resort to abandoned buildings to
seek contraband health care. Yet abortion has been legal on broad grounds
in South Africa since 1997.4 In fact, the Choice on Termination of Pregnan-
cy Act (CTOPA)5 is heralded as one of the most progressive abortion laws
in the world.6 The law permits unfettered access to government-funded
abortion services for all women through the twelfth week of gestation, stat-
ing in its preamble that "every woman [has] the right to choose whether to
have an early, safe and legal termination of pregnancy according to her in-
dividual beliefs."7
Despite increased availability of legal abortions' (and the inclusion of
rights to reproductive health care and decision-making in South Africa's
Constitution),9 the number of illegal terminations in South Africa does not
appear to have decreased significantly since liberalization.o Although there
have been lower rates of matemal mortality associated with illegal abor-
tion," indications of maternal morbidity-illness or negative health ef-
fects-remain high.12 News stories like the one above suggest that the
CTOPA has made little difference to practices on the ground.
3. Id.
4. See, e.g., Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act 92 of 1996 (S. Afr.) [hereinafter CTOPA].
5. See id.
6. See Audrey E. Haroz, South Africa's 1996 Choice on Termination ofPregnancy Act: Expanding
Choice and International Human Rights to Black South African Women, 30 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
863, 903 (1997) (describing the CTOPA as the "forefront of defining human rights"); Charles Ngwena,
An Appraisal of Abortion Laws in Southern Africa from a Reproductive Health Rights Perspective, 32
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 708, 713 (2004) [hereinafter Ngwena, Appraisal ofAbortion Law] (describing the
CTOPA as "exemplary").
7. CTOPA, supra note 4, pmbl., amended by Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Amendment
Act 1 of 2008 (S. Aft.).
8. Statistics show that in the first year of the CTOPA's operation over 26,000 legal abortions were
performed, which is a much higher number of recorded abortions than the legal abortions performed
under the precursor to the CTOPA. TOPS (Terminations of Pregnancy), HEALTH SYSTEMS TRUST,
http://indicators.hst.org.za/healthstats/47/data (last visited Sept. 9, 2011).
9. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, ch. 2, § 12(2)(a) ("Everyone has the right to bodily and psychological
integrity, which includes the right to make decisions concerning reproduction"); id ch. 2, § 27(l)(a)
("Everyone has the right to have access to health care services, including reproductive health care").
10. See, e.g., Banwari L. Meel & Ram P. Kaswa, The Impact ofthe Choice on Termination ofPreg-
nancy Act of 1996 (Act 92 of 1996) on Criminal Abortions in the Mthatha Area of South Africa, I AFR. J.
PRIMARY HEALTH CARE & FAM. MED. 79, 79-80 (2009).
11. However, the 2005-2007 Savings Mothers Report showed a small increase in the number of
avoidable deaths, which was "the first time since the introduction of [the] report that an increase, rather
than a decrease, in abortion-related maternal mortality has been seen - with the evidence suggesting the
increase in deaths is due to unsafe abortions." Chris Bateman, Abortion Practices Undermining Reform-
ist Laws, 101 S. AFRICAN MED. J. 302, 302 (2011).
12. See infra Part IV (citing Jewkes study).
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The purpose of this Article is to explore this gap between law and prac-
tice, and to highlight some of the limitations of decriminalization and libera-
lization agendas for those advocating on behalf of reproductive rights. Or-
ganizations supporting women's rights exerted significant influence during
the dismantling of apartheid, in part due to the desire of those engineering
the new democracy to break with the discriminatory policies of the past and
to incorporate international human rights norms into the new Constitution.13
Like many women's rights reform projects, proponents of the CTOPA re-
lied on the autonomy and equality rights expressed in international docu-
ments, such as those agreed to at the International Conference on Population
and Development (ICPD) in 1994 and the Fourth World Conference on
Women (FWCW) in 1995.14
Advocates complemented human rights principles with legislative lan-
guage embraced by the international community that responds to the per-
ceived failures and controversies of privacy jurisprudence in the United
States.15 Two areas where this is particularly clear are the CTOPA's treat-
ment of parental involvement in minors' abortion decisions, and the refusals
or conscientious objections of health care providers. Although providers
must advise minors to consult with their "parents, guardian, family mem-
bers or friends," 6 the CTOPA allows women of any age to obtain an abor-
tion without permission from a parent." It is also silent on whether and how
a medical professional may refuse care because of religious or moral be-
liefs.
Yet the controversies that its drafters sought to avoid are obstacles to
the implementation of the CTOPA.18 Provider refusals and parental consent
were some of the first issues raised in court challenges to the CTOPA and
the current standard for deciding conflicts in these areas is not at all clear."
Moreover, what reformists believed they would achieve-unencumbered
access to abortion care-has been elusive. Problems endemic to the larger
primary health care system, such as a lack of designated facilities and train-
13. See infra Part II.A.
14. See International Conference on Population and Development, Cairo, Egypt, Sept. 5-13, 1994,
Report of the International Conference on Population and Development, chs. 2 & 4, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.171/13/Rev. I (Sept. 13, 1994) [hereinafter ICPD], available at http://www.unhcr.org/ ref-
world/docid/4a54bc080.html; Fourth World Conference on Women, Beijing, China, Sept. 4-15, 1995,
Report of the Fourth World Conference on Women, ch. 1.1, if1 2-5, 7, 16-17, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.177/20/Rev.1, Annex I (Sept. 15, 1995) [hereinafter FWCW].
15. See infra Part I11.B (describing the U.S. influence on international reproductive rights activism).
16. CTOPA, supra note 4, § 5(3); see B. Bekink & M. Bekink, Aspects of rape, statutory rape and
the Choice on the Termination of Pregnancy Act 92 of 1996: Do we protect our minor women?, 69
TYDSKRIF VIR HEDENDAAGSE ROMEINS-HOLLANDSE REG (J. CONTEMP. ROMAN-DUTCH L.) 14, 19-20
(2006).
17. CTOPA, supra note 4, § 5(2)-(3).
18. See infra Part IV.A-C.
19. See infra Part IV.A-B (describing controversy and confusion around provider refusals and
parental consent).
2011] 3
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ing for health professionals, impede the effective implementation of the
law. 20
By describing the South African experience of abortion law reform, this
Article maps the origins of transnational legislative strategies for reproduc-
tive rights. It questions how shifting focus might help address abortion care
delivery in countries with diverse histories and needs. Strategies focused on
liberalizing access to abortion may be well suited to a project in which the
primary and most important aim is to create a rights-based framework. Yet
they may not respond to implementation problems, help ensure delivery of
health services, or take account of the unique context of service delivery.
Part I of this Article provides the historical context for passing the
CTOPA by describing the regulation of and public reaction to abortion dur-
ing apartheid. Part II explores the influence of the international campaign
for gender equality on the South African constitutional drafting process,
which facilitated the incorporation of reproductive rights. Part III more spe-
cifically addresses the strategies for drafting the CTOPA and shows how
U.S. case law and activism influences transnational reproductive rights
movements. Part IV describes obstacles to implementing the CTOPA and
situates those problems in relation to the CTOPA's drafting. Part V envi-
sions how an alternative strategy might incorporate reform of a country's
primary health care system-noting, as an example, key differences and
similarities in the abortion law reform strategies employed in Nepal. The
Article concludes by reflecting on the importance of using moments of po-
litical transition to harness the powerful rhetoric of rights for goals aligned
with the improvement of a country's health care system.
I. ABORTION LAW DURING APARTHEID
Since the CTOPA took effect on February 1, 1997, the reproductive
health landscape in South Africa has changed dramatically in some ways
and minimally in others.2 1 This Part will review the history and politics of
abortion regulation in South Africa that laid the foundation for the enact-
ment of the CTOPA.22
Prior to 1975, there was no statute regulating abortion, and South Afri-
ca's abortion law was based on the Roman-Dutch common law that crimi-
nalized abortion unless the life of the mother was in danger.23 South African
courts also relied on the interpretation of England's Offences Against the
Person Act of 1861 to permit abortion that preserved a pregnant woman's
20. See infra Part IV.C (describing implementation problems for the CTOPA).
21. See CTOPA, supra note 4.
22. This Article does not purport to describe the complex and rich history of South Africa. For a
concise account of the dominant legal influences shaping the transition to democracy, see HEINZ KLUG,
CONSTITUTING DEMOCRACY: LAw, GLOBALISM AND SOUTH AFRICA'S POLITICAL RECONSTRUCTION
29-47 (2000).
23. See Charles Ngwena, The History and Transformation of Abortion Law in South Africa, 30
ACTA ACADEMICA 32, 35-36 (1998) [hereinafter Ngwena, History and Transformation].
4 [Vol.63: 1:1
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physical or mental health.24 Judges and legal scholars disagreed about the
legality of other exceptions and there was scant legislative or regulatory
guidance about what constituted a threat to life or health.25 By passing the
Abortion and Sterilisation Bill of 1975 (1975 Act), 26 the apartheid govern-
ment intended to clarify the application of the common law,27 foreclose any
discussion of legalizing abortion on request, and discourage abortions for
white women.2 8 The 1975 Act provided for abortion in extremely restricted
29circumstances, permitting legal abortion only when there was a serious
threat to a woman's physical or mental health, risk of serious disability of
the fetus, or in instances of rape or incest.30 Legal abortion required the ap-
proval of two medical practitioners, in addition to the approval of the practi-
tioner performing the abortion and a hospital superintendent. 3 1 The district
surgeon and a magistrate had to certify abortion for reasons of rape or in-
cest.32 Abortion on the ground of mental health required the assessment of a
state-registered psychiatrist or approval of a magistrate. 33 Violations of the
law could result in a fine of 5,000 rand and a five-year prison term.34
24. R v. Boume, [1939] 1 K.B. 687.
25. South Africa recognized an exception for mental health if continuing a pregnancy would make
the woman a "mental wreck." This standard is set out in the English case, R v. Bourne, supra note 24.
See Jeremy Sarkin, Patriarchy and Discrimination in Apartheid South Africa's Abortion Law, 4 BUFF.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 141, 145-47 (1998) [hereinafter Sarkin, Patriarchy and Discrimination].
26. Abortion and Sterilisation Act 2 of 1975 § 3 (S. Afr.), amended by Act 48 of 1982, repealed by
CTOPA, Act 92 of 1996 (S. Afr.). The 1982 Amendment did not make substantive changes to the 1975
Act.
27. See Ngwena, History and Transformation, supra note 23, at 35-36. A segment of society ame-
nable to reform of the 1975 Act was the medical profession. Even when grounds for legal abortion
existed, there were not enough physicians to provide the sort of oversight that the 1975 Act required.
See also Jeremy Sarkin-Hughes, A Perspective on Abortion Legislation in South Africa's Bill of Rights
Era, 56 TYDSKRIF VIR HEDENDAAGSE ROMErNS-HOLLANDSE REG (J. CONTEMP. ROMAN-DUTCH L.) 83,
90(1993).
28. Sarkin, Patriarchy and Discrimination, supra note 25, at 142. Although this Article does not
explore all of the motivations for passing the 1975 Act, one influence, tracking the discussion of Part III
of this Article, was the desire of apartheid legislators to distinguish South Africa from the several West-
em European and North American countries that began to liberalize abortion law in the late 1960s and
early 1970s. Id. at 153.
29. Sarkin-Hughes, supra note 27, at 87.
30. Abortion and Sterilisation Act 2 of 1975 § 3 (S. Aft.), amended by Act 48 of 1982 (S. Afr.),
repealed by CTOPA.
31. See id. §§ 3-7.
32. Haroz, supra note 6, at 881.
33. See Sally Guttmacher et al., Abortion Reform in South Africa: A Case Study of the 1996 Choice
on Termination of Pregnancy Act, 24 INT'L FAM. PLANNING PERSP. 191, 192 (1998). Prior to the 1975
Act, "white women procured abortions from their private practitioners using a loophole in the common
law that allowed terminations if the pregnancy posed a threat to the woman's mental well-being." Je-
rome A. Singh et al., South Africa a Decade After Apartheid: Realizing Health Through Human Rights,
12 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 355, 373 (2005). The medical profession protested the lack of clari-
ty in the law, fearing prosecution for performing an abortion that a judge might decide did not meet a
common law exception. Sarkin, Patriarchy and Discrimination, supra note 25, at 147. The support of
the medical profession for reform is similar to the experience of the United States where physicians
feared criminal and civil liability because of the vague standards at work. See Reva B. Siegel, Roe's
Roots: The Women's Rights Claims that Engendered Roe, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1875, 1884 (2010) [hereinaf-
ter Siegel, Roe's Roots]; BEFORE ROE V. WADE: VOICEs THAT SHAPED THE ABORTION DEBATE BEFORE
THE SUPREME COURT'S RULING 25 (Linda Greenhouse & Reva Siegel eds., 2010). More modernly,
medical associations in Northern Ireland supported clarification of the Offences Against the Person Act
HeinOnline  -- 63 Ala. L. Rev. 5 2011-2012
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Despite the threat of criminal prosecution, before and under the 1975
Act, the law had little to do with many women's abortion decisions. Gaining
access to designated state hospitals, multiple doctors, psychiatrists, or courts
was financially and logistically impossible for most women, particularly
"those who were poor, black and lived outside of major urban areas." 36 Phy-
sicians performed only about 1,000 legal abortions per year during the years
of the 1975 Act's operation. In contrast, the estimated number of annual
illegal abortions was high. One study cites 250,000 illegal abortions per
year under the 1975 Act,38 and two others cite ranges of 100,000 to
500,000.39 Though varying widely, all studies highlight the health problems
associated with illegally-obtained abortions. 40 Frequently cited research
conducted by the Medical Research Council (MRC) found that, in one year,
over 44,000 women presented to hospitals with complications from induced
terminations and more than 400 women died.4 1
Although differing from community to community, customary law dealt
with abortion as a family matter that could result in condemnation from a
member of one's community or family rather than criminal punishment.42
For example, abortion was prevalent in the Sotho community. 43 Family
councils settled controversies arising from terminations or requests for ter-
minations on a case-by-case basis.44 The treatment of abortion under custo-
mary law, at least before the CTOPA, was similar to the treatment of many
family issues. Family members and community leaders mediated conflicts
between spouses, parents and children, and intervened when important is-
of 1861, as interpreted at common law, governing abortion in the region. See Rebecca J. Cook & Susan-
nah Howard, Accommodating Women's Differences Under the Women's Anti-discrimination Conven-
tion, 56 EMORY L.J. 1039, 1067-69 (2007) (citing the brief filed by the Family Planning Association
(FPA) and supported by the Royal College of Nursing and the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gy-
naecologists).
34. Abortion and Sterilisation Act 2 of 1975 § 10 (S. Afr.), amended by Act 48 of 1982 (S. Afr.),
repealed by CTOPA.
35. UN INT'L RESEARCH AND TRAINING INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF WOMEN, ENGENDERING
THE POLITICAL AGENDA: THE ROLE OF THE STATE, WOMEN'S ORGANIZATIONS, AND THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 179 (Tatjana Sikoska et. al. eds., 2000); Diane Cooper et al., Ten Years of
Democracy in South Africa: Documenting Transformation in Reproductive Health Policy and Status, 12
REPROD. HEALTH MATTERS 70, 71 (2004) [hereinafter Cooper et al., Ten Years].
36. UN INT'L RESEARCH AND TRAINING INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF WOMEN, supra note 35,
at 195 (noting official statistics throughout the 1970s and 1980s demonstrate that access to legal abor-
tions under the 1975 Act was largely determined by race and class).
37. Sarkin-Hughes, supra note 27, at 84; see also Guttmacher et al., supra note 33, at 192.
38. Barbara Klugman & Sanjani Jane Varkey, From Policy Development to Policy Implementation:
The South African Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act, in ADVOCATING FOR ABORTION ACCESS:
ELEVEN COUNTRY STUDIES 252 (Barbara Klugman & Debbie Budlender eds., 2001).
39. Guttmacher et al., supra note 33, at 192; Sarkin-Hughes, supra note 27, at 83.
40. See Jeremy Sarkin, Suggestions for a New Abortion Law for South Africa, 9 S. AFR. J. CRIM.
JUST. 125, 138 (1996) (noting the commonly known consequences of illegal abortions under the 1975
Act were disability and infertility).
41. Guttmacher et al., supra note 33, at 192.
42. See Ngwena, Appraisal ofAbortion Law, supra note 6, at 711.
43. See Charles Ngwena, History and Transformation, supra note 23, at 35.
44. See id.; see also Bernard M. Dickens & Rebecca J. Cook, Development of Commonwealth
Abortion Laws, 28 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 424, 427 (1979).
6 [Vol.63: 1:1
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sues (around work, inheritance, or procreation, for example) arose.4 5 It was
often traditional healers or midwives that performed abortions.4 6
The continuing oversight of abortion decisions by community members
mirrors how the colonial and apartheid governments "delegated" or left
governance over family matters to the local leaders. Under the Black Ad-
ministration Act of 1927, black South African leaders retained power over
black communities, and colonial powers respected that power so long as it
was not "repugnant to the general principles of humanity observed through-
out the civilized world."4 7 Subsequent legislation allowed state courts to
take notice of customary law if readily ascertainable or known with suffi-
cient certainty, except when the court found that custom contravened public
policy or offended principles of natural justice. 48
Courts during apartheid could have found the potentially less restrictive
standards for abortion under certain customary laws, as compared to appli-
cation of the common law, contrary to public policy. But there is evidence
to suggest that the government turned a blind eye to communities skirting
the 1975 Act and its common law precursor, in large part due to the white
state's desire to curb black population growth. 4 9 Governance of black com-
munities by one set of customary rules and governance of white communi-
ties by "the state" was foundational to the apartheid order.50 As a result, the
customary practices that exerted significant influence, playing a central and
long-standing role in local governance, sit in tension with the recognition of
national state authority. Some of the most vexing questions for the post-
apartheid government relate to how a new constitutional democracy should
accommodate traditions that powerfully shape people's behavior-a theme
that emerges clearly in the context of the CTOPA's implementation.
Adding to the complexity of abortion regulation, reactions to abortion
cut across political lines. National surveys before the passage of the CTOPA
revealed significant ambivalence about the liberalization of abortion law,
with thirty-four percent of respondents against abortion in all circumstances,
forty-five percent in support of the 1975 Act, and twenty-one percent in
favor of broader access to legal abortion.5 1 Both conservative and progres-
45. See Tracy Higgins et al., Gender Equality and Customary Marriage: Bargaining in the Shadow
ofPost-apartheid Legal Pluralism, 30 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1653, 1678-79 (2007) (describing customa-
ry treatment of domestic violence, for example, as an issue resolved by family members and tribal lead-
ers and not police).
46. Susanne M. Klausen, Keynote Address at the University of Alberta: Clandestine Abortion in
South Africa during Apartheid (Jan. 3, 2008), available at http://www.uofaweb.ualberta.cal
ois/pdfs/Uof A keynotelectureKlausen%20(2).JanO308.doc.
47. Black Administration Act 38 of 1927 (S. Afr.); see also T.W. BENNETT, CUSTOMARY LAW IN
SOUTH AFRICA 38 (2004).
48. Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988 § 1(1) (S. Afr.).
49. Klausen, supra note 46.
50. See Marius Pieterse, It's a "Black Thing": Upholding Culture and Customary Law in a Society
Founded on Non-Racialism, 17 S. AFR. J. ON HUM. RTS. 364, 371 (2001).
51. UN INT'L RESEARCH AND TRAINING INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF WOMEN, supra note 35,
at 202 (citing D. Budlender & D. Everatt, How Many For and How Many Against? Private and Public
Opinion on Abortion, 40 AGENDA 101, 102 (1999)). Just before the passage of the CTOPA, consultation
72011]
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52
sive political factions opposed abortion before the CTOPA. Many anti-
apartheid activists, for example, had strong religious beliefs that abortion
was immoral. 5 3 Moreover, some anti-apartheid leaders viewed the feminist
movement (and groups like the Abortion Reform Action Group (ARAG), a
leader in organizing for the repeal of the 1975 Act during apartheid) 54 as
fixated on an agenda for white, middle-class women and detached from the
concerns of black South Africans.
This attitude reflects in part the racist family planning policies of the
apartheid era.56 The apartheid government instituted population control laws
to encourage white women to bear children through tax incentives and pub-
lic appeals to have "enough children to ensure [South Africa's] continued
existence as a Christian and Western country on the continent of Africa."5 7
In contrast, policies designed to "control" the black population promoted
broad and free use of contraceptives.5 8 Health care providers injected black
women with the contraceptive drug, Depo-Provera, at times without their
consent and at three times the recommended dosage.59
Against this backdrop of opposition and skepticism from diverse quar-
ters, one might imagine that repealing the 1975 Act and enacting new legis-
lation would take time and popular support. However, the transition from
apartheid to a representative democracy produced a crucial moment for fe-
minist advocates: the new government's commitment to human rights
would prove pivotal in supporting historically marginalized issues like re-
productive rights. The next Part describes the critical juncture at which ac-
tivists exerted influence in constitution drafting and legislative reform.
on the Women's Charter, a document drafted by the Women's National Coalition, showed that many
women were ambivalent about abortion because of their moral or ethical beliefs. Id.
52. Id. at 196.
53. Guttmacher et al., supra note 33, at 193; Barbara Stark, Crazy Jane Talks with the Bishop:
Abortion in China, Germany, South Africa and International Human Rights Law, 12 TEX. J. WOMEN &
L. 287, 304 (2003).
54. Guttmacher et al., supra note 33, at 191.
55. Penelope Andrews, The Stepchild of National Liberation: Women and Rights in the New South
Africa, in THE POST-APARTHEID CONSTITUTIONS: PERSPECTIVES ON SOUTH AFRICA'S BASIC LAW 329
(Penelope Andrews & Stephen Ellmann eds., 2001) [hereinafter Andrews, Stepchild]; see also Saras
Jagwanth & Christina Murray, "No Nation Can Be Free When One Half of It Is Enslaved": Constitu-
tional Equality for Women in South Africa, in THE GENDER OF CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE 231
(Beverley Baines & Ruth Rubio-Marin eds., 2005).
56. Kelly Blanchard et al., Abortion Law in South Africa: Passage of a Progressive Law and Chal-
lenges for Implementation, 139 GACETA MDICA DE MEXICO 109, 110 (2003).
57. Singh et al., supra note 33, at 373 (citing a speech delivered by the apartheid government's
Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, M.C. Botha).
58. Id
59. See Barbara Brown, Facing the "Black Peril": The Politics of Population Control in South
Africa, 13 J. S. AFR. STUD. 256, 267-68 (1987) (describing the apartheid government's coercive meas-
ures targeted at black South Africans in implementing family planning policies); see also Cooper et al.,
Ten Years, supra note 35, at 71 (describing the broad use of contraceptive injections, which are less
reversible than the birth control pill, for black, rural women).
8 [Vol.63: 1:1
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II. THE FOUNDATIONS OF REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS ADVOCACY
A. Gender Equality and Drafting the South African Constitution
Support for reproductive rights gained momentum as leaders of the anti-
apartheid movement began to assemble the structure for a constitutional,
representative democracy. Architects of the new legal order, who were in-
strumental in supporting the emergence of human rights thinking in the
1980s and 1990s, relied heavily on international human rights law to build
consensus and to strengthen the legitimacy of the "government-in-waiting,"
led by the African National Congress (ANC). 60 Advocates aided key mem-
bers of the ANC in translating a commitment to human rights into a consti-
tutional agenda that included gender equality and reproductive rights.6 1
By the start of constitutional negotiations, South African advocates,
from both women's rights and civil rights groups, had formed influential
organizations in civil society. 62 Working as a coalition, they situated them-
selves as part of a "well orchestrated campaign" connected to a "global fe-
minist endeavor."63 These advocates called for explicit and extensive equali-
ty rights that would both address the segregationist legacy of apartheid and
recognize all forms of discrimination as equally repugnant.64 Human rights
treaties that advocates interpreted as recognizing substantive equality, like
the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination
Against Women, provided the anchor for making women's rights central to
the new constitution.
Substantive equality recognizes equality as a norm that can both level
the playing field for men and women and justify the redistribution of re-
sources in ways that take account of women's historic disadvantage. 66 Al-
though still needing "conceptualisation, concretisation and indigenisation,"
this "expansive" form of equality features prominently in post-apartheid
60. Kieran McEvoy & Rachel Rebouch6, Mobilizing the Professions: Lawyers, Politics, and the
Collective Legal Conscience, in JUDGES, TRANSITION, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 300-09 (John Morison et al.
eds., 2007).
61. UN INT'L RESEARCH AND TRAINING INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF WOMEN, supra note 35,
at 202. Early in the life of the Parliament, almost thirty percent of its members were women because of
an ANC quota. Arguably, the high proportion of women in government and at the table for constitutional
negotiations helped make gender equality a priority for the ANC. Jagwanth & Murray, supra note 55, at
238.
62. Andrews, Stepchild, supra note 55, at 346; see also Yvonne Mokgoro, Constitutional Claims for
Gender Equality in South Africa: A Judicial Response, 67 ALB. L. REV. 565, 566 (2003).
63. Penelope E. Andrews, Striking the Rock: Confronting Gender Equality in South Africa, 3 MICH.
J. RACE & L. 307, 309, 310 (1998) [hereinafter Andrews, Striking the Rock].
64. Andrews, Striking the Rock, supra note 63, at 309.
65. Id. at 314-15; Ruth Rubio-Marin & Martha I. Morgan, Constitutional Domestication of Interna-
tional Gender Norms: Categorizations, Illustrations, and Reflections from the Nearside of the Bridge, in
GENDER AND HUMAN RIGHTS 121 (Karen Knop ed., 2004).
66. Charles Ngwena, Accessing Abortion Services Under the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy
Act: Realising Substantive Equality, 25 J. JURID. SCI. 19, 25-26 (2000) [hereinafter Ngwena, Accessing
Abortion].
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jurisprudence because of its perceived potential to address wealth and re-
source disparities among South Africans.
The extent to which the South African Constitution includes protections
for gender equality and reflects the influence of modem human rights is a
testament to the persuasiveness of the "well orchestrated campaign" of fe-
minist activists. 68 The equality rights in Section 9 of the Constitution in-
clude "equal protection and benefit of the law"; non-discrimination on the
grounds of sex, gender, sexual orientation, marital status, and pregnancy;
and protection for positive action to redress past disadvantage. 6 9 Likewise,
Section 15 requires that customary law comply with equality principles, and
the Preamble recognizes "non-sexism" as a foundational principle of the
Constitution and the new republic.70
B. Constitutional Reproductive Rights in the Global Context
South African advocates participated in a global movement that linked
persistent gender inequality to the state's control of women's reproductive
capacity and childbearing decisions. 7 1 As Rebecca Cook explains, modem
momentum for liberalization comes from activism to improve women's
reproductive health and wider recognition that safe and dignified healthcare
is a universal, human right.72 The then-recent activism around the ICPD,73
as well as the FWCW, helped advocates set out an international approach to
reproductive rights: 74 the "[ICPD and FWCW] and the parallel discourse
around them in many ways smoothed the way for the formal adoption of
similar constitutional guarantees and for the efforts to implement them in
South Africa."7 5 In the United States, a human rights approach gained mo-
mentum in the years after Roe v. Wade. Reva Siegel explains that although
health professionals first lead the charge to liberalize abortion laws, femin-
ists shaped the discourse over abortion-restrictive laws resulted in the dig-
nitarian harms of coerced motherhood, economic exclusion, and interper-
sonal dependence7 6 that were violations of women's constitutional rights.7 7
On the global level, it is now common to talk about abortion as "a constella-
67. Id. at 25.
68. Andrews, Striking the Rock, supra note 63, at 310.
69. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, ch. 2, § 9. Helen Irving has shown that Canada and Australia, for exam-
ple, incorporated constitutional language like "equal benefit" of the law to emphasize substantive equali-
ty principles. See HELEN IRVING, GENDER AND THE CONSTITUTION: EQUITY AND AGENCY IN
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 168-78 (2008).
70. See S. AFR. CONST., 1996, ch. 1, § 1 (founding provisions); Andrews, Stepchild, supra note 55,
at 328-32 (describing the gender equality innovations of the South African Constitution).
71. See Cook & Howard, supra note 33, at 1045 (emphasizing the ways in which the equality prin-
ciples in CEDAW, for example, should be used to support reproductive health rights).
72. Rebecca J. Cook & Bernard M. Dickens, Human Rights Dynamics of Abortion Law Reform, 25
HUM. RTS. Q. 1, 2-3, 12-13 (2003).
73. ICPD, supra note 14.
74. FWCW, supra note 14.
75. Andrews, Stepchild, supra note 55, at 346.
76. Siegel, Roe's Roots, supra note 33, at 1883.
77. Id. at 1894.
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tion of human rights, including the rights to privacy, liberty, physical integr-
ity, non-discrimination and health."7 8
The provisions of the ICPD addressed why rights to reproductive health
care and decision-making were central to women's ability to realize their
full equality.7 9 Prior conventions on population and development dealt with
reproductive health in terms of controlling the world's birth rate and ensur-
ing free parental choices about whether to have children.80 The Mexico City
population conference held in 1984, for example, focused on family plan-
ning measures as a means to alleviate poverty and to relieve pressures on
environmental resources by reducing family size.81 Advocates across the
world mobilized against abuses committed by states in enforcing population
policies, such as laws requiring sterilization of certain populations of wom-
en or penalizing the use of contraceptives or abortion.82 They argued that
women's poor reproductive health, as measured through maternal morbidity
and mortality rates, was a consequence of laws that stigmatized ending or
prohibiting pregnancy.
The 1994 ICPD was the first global conference on population that had a
high level of non-governmental organization (NGO) involvement, with the
result that civil society and government representatives worked closely to-
gether to draft consensus principles. 84 This influenced the rights-based
framework of the ICPD's Programme for Action, now described as the do-
minant model for international law reform in the area of reproductive
health. Instead of concentrating on population or fertility control, the
ICPD principles seek to improve individual well-being, advance women's
78. Christina Zampas & Jamie M. Gher, Abortion as a Human Right-International and Regional
Standards, 8 HUM. RTS. L. REv. 249, 255 (2008).
79. Cooper et al., Ten Years, supra note 35, at 71-72; UN INT'L RESEARCH AND TRAINING INST.
FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF WOMEN, supra note 35, at 207; Andrews, Stepchild, supra note 55, at 346.
80. FAMILY PLANNING COAL., REPORT ON U.S. REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH 17 (2009) (on file with
author).
81. See Laura Reichenbach, The Global Reproductive Health and Rights Agenda: Opportunities and
Challenges for the Future, in REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE WAY FORWARD 24-25
(Laura Reichenbach & Mindy Jane Roseman eds., 2009) (stating that the Mexico City conference fo-
cused on the effects of overpopulation on poverty levels and the environment). Note that the population
control premise was and remains controversial. Research has shown that family size is not necessarily an
indicator of poverty. In fact, the opposite may be true: low-income families that have more children can
often better cope with economic demands. See Mindy Jane Roseman & Laura Reichenbach, Global
Reproductive Health and Rights: Reflecting on ICPD, in REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS:
THE WAY FORWARD 10-11 (Laura Reichenbach & Mindy Jane Roseman eds., 2009).
82. Roseman & Reichenbach., supra note 81, at 7-8.
83. Id.
84. NADINE TAUB, AM. SOC'Y OF INT'L L., INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON POPULATION AND
DEVELOPMENT 2 & n.4 (1994) (on file with author).
85. Highlighting support for the ICPD, however, is not intended to ignore the implementation diffi-
culties of the ICPD or to minimize the tensions that exist between a reproductive rights focus and the
"global health agenda," many of the objectives of which are in part reflected in the United Nations
Millennium Development Goals. See Roseman & Reichenbach, supra note 81, at 17-18 (arguing that
attention has shifted over the last ten years from reproductive rights to issues such as malaria or tubercu-
losis as captured by the United Nations Millennium Development Goals; noting that an implementation
strategy for the ICPD is underdeveloped).
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empowerment, and secure gender equality globally. 86 Through collabora-
tions of state and non-state actors, it sets out an agenda for the delivery of
reproductive health services by urging reform of primary health care sys-
tems, community participation, and technical assistance from the interna-
tional community. 8 7 The ICPD does not itself include a right to abortion but
stresses the need for safe, effective, and affordable health services.88 The
omission of the right to an abortion was the result of compromise.89 Howev-
er, the presence or absence of laws allowing abortion on request or permit-
ting specific grounds for abortion has become a marker of whether states are
committed to women's reproductive rights.90 The FWCW, for example,
draws upon the wording and general intent of the ICPD to urge states to
reconsider laws criminalizing abortion as a means to improve women's
health.91
C. Reproductive Rights in the South African Constitution
These international conversations resonated in South Africa, which was
in the process of drafting a new constitution. 92 The ANC made the inclusion
of reproductive health and decision-making in the Bill of Rights a priority
even though some members of the Constitutional Assembly opposed includ-
ing constitutional language on reproductive matters.9 3 Members of the ANC
Health Commission formed a women's commission that worked with advo-
cates to add a statement of support for abortion rights.94 The 1994 ANC
Health Plan included the statement that "[e]very woman must have the right
86. Id. at 8, 10-11.
87. ICPD, supra note 14, 7.6-7.11.
88. Id. 1 8.25 ("All Governments and relevant intergovernmental and non-governmental organiza-
tions are urged to strengthen their commitment to women's health, to deal with the health impact of
unsafe abortion as a major public health concern .... In circumstances where abortion is not against the
law, such abortion should be safe. In all cases, women should have access to quality services for the
management of complications arising from abortion.").
89. ADRIENNE GERMAIN & TERESA KIM, INT'L WOMEN'S HEALTH COAL., EXPANDING ACCESS TO
SAFE ABORTION: STRATEGIES FOR ACTION 3-4, 6 (1998) available at http://www.iwhc.org/ sto-
rage/iwhc/docUploads/ExpandingAccess English.pdf?documentlD=3.
90. Id at 3-4.
91. "In the light of paragraph 8.25 of the Programme of Action of the International Conference on
Population and Development, . . . [states should] consider reviewing laws containing punitive measures
against women who have undergone illegal abortions[.]" FWCW, supra note 14, T 106(k). Since the
FWCW, several other international human rights documents have linked the violation of human rights to
health, life, and equality and laws that limit abortion access. See, e.g., Comm. on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women, Rep. on its 20 & 21" Sess., Jan. 19-Feb.5, 1999 & Jun. 7-25, 1999,
ch. I.A.8, U.N. Doc. A/54/38 Rev.1 (Aug. 20, 1999) [hereinafter CEDAW], available at
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/reports/21report.pdf, See generally Zampas & Gher, supra
note 78, at 249 ("summari[zing] pertinent developments within the United Nations, European, Inter-
American and African human rights systems regarding abortion").
92. UN INT'L RESEARCH AND TRAINING INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF WOMEN, supra note 35,
at 197-99.
93. A 1992 draft of the Bill of Rights stated only that "[l]egislation may provide for reproductive
rights and rights associated with child-birth and child-raising shall be respected." Id. at 292 n.74 (citing a
paper of the Constitutional Committee of the African National Congress).
94. Id. at 208-10.
12 [Vol.63:1:1
HeinOnline  -- 63 Ala. L. Rev. 12 2011-2012
The Limits of Reproductive Rights
to choose whether or not to have an early termination [of pregnancy] ac-
cording to her individual beliefs."95 The Constitutional Assembly ultimately
agreed to language securing a right to make decisions concerning reproduc-
tion (section 12(2)(a)) and a right to reproductive health care services (sec-
tion 27(1)(a)). 96 With these provisions, South Africa became the first na-
tional constitution to recognize positive rights to both reproductive decision-
making and reproductive health care. 9 7
Framing reproductive health and autonomy as matters of gender equali-
ty embedded a rights approach to securing access to reproductive health
services.98 If the role of law is to free women from coerced motherhood,
which limits women's ability to realize equality and other rights, then
reform strategies will focus on legalization as the means to ensure that
women can decide not to become mothers. The state's role is partly one of
non-interference in an individual's exercise of her rights, rather than polic-
ing women's choices through the penal or civil code. 99 But, as a positive
right, it also suggests that the delivery of state services will follow. The
South African movement for post-apartheid gender equality, like feminist
activism elsewhere,100 "envision[ed] the legal levers it pulls as activating a
highly monolithic and state-centered form of power." 01 Formalizing protec-
tion for women in terms of substantive and state-centered rights102 high-
lights important presumptions that lie at the heart of reproductive rights
reform projects.
Approached in this light, law grants women the capacity to decide
whether to terminate pregnancies and does not restrict choice based on who
the woman is or her reason, allowing women to reap health and other so-
cietal benefits.1o3 Modem thinking about reproductive rights concerns not
just women's status as decision-makers but links rights of equality and au-
tonomy to women's health and well-being, self-determination, and equal
citizenship.104 Yet, as has been the critique of rights generally, the expres-
95. Id. at 200 (citing the 1994 Reconstruction and Development Programme of the African National
Congress).
96. Id. at211-12.
97. See S. AFR. CONST., 1996, ch. 2, §§ 12(2)(a), 27(l)(a); IRVING, supra note 69, at 199 (describing
the reproductive rights provisions of the South African Constitution as "recent and rare" and "unusual,
perhaps unique").
98. See Ngwena, Appraisal ofAbortion Law, supra note 6, at 716 (arguing that the protection of
reproductive rights as an equality matter seeks to improve women's lives).
99. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, SECURITY, TERRITORY, POPULATION: LECTURES AT THE COLLEGE DE
FRANCE, 1977-78, at 352-55 (Michel Senellart et al. eds., Graham Burchell trans., 2007) (discussing a
shift in governmental control from prevention to promotion in modem economies).
100. Andrews, Stepchild, supra note 55, at 331.
101. Janet Halley et al., From the International to the Local in Feminist Legal Responses to Rape,
Prostitution/Sex Work, and Sex Trafficking: Four Studies in Contemporary Governance Feminism, 29
HARV. J.L. & GENDER 335, 341 (2006).
102. Id. at 340-42; see also Rubio-Marin & Morgan, supra note 65, at 117.
103. See, e.g., Lance Gable, Reproductive Health as a Human Right, 60 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 957,
968 (2010) (stating that reproductive rights "apply to all humans by virtue of their humanity and that
these rights can be claimed from governments, which have a legal obligation to uphold them").
104. See generally id. at 969-70 (arguing that reproductive health, understood as a human rights
issue, encompasses positive rights to welfare, health as well as negative rights related to autonomy and
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sion of a right may become an end in itself and may be overly dependent on
state recognition and enforcement. 0 5 The focus of South African advocates
was to legalize abortion and replace the 1975 Act with a law that allows
greater access to abortion services, which was a likely starting place. 10 6 Per-
haps the South African Constitution contemplated reproductive health in
broader terms. For example, the Constitution guarantees a right to "health
care services" complemented by a state duty to "take reasonable legislative
and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progres-
sive realization" of that right. 10 7 Even though the CTOPA's Preamble refer-
ences the need for comprehensive reproductive health services, its text does
not.108 The provisions for the CTOPA do not mention the details of health
service delivery or the means by which women already procured abortions.
The trajectory of activism in South Africa may have appeared as the on-
ly option, rather than one of many, available to those seeking to increase
women's access to safe abortion. The CTOPA, as the primary piece of leg-
islation pursued by advocates on the heels of constitutional reform, may
have "attract[ed] institutional energy and resources that would otherwise
flow elsewhere." 09 Indeed, it appears that the South African strategy was a
self-conscious reaction to the reproductive rights activism in the United
States, where pro-choice arguments are now "compound claims on dignity,
liberty, and equality" that articulate the availability of abortion services in
the language of rights.110 Part III looks closely at the values that animate
reform priorities, specifically U.S.-influenced concepts of women's repro-
ductive rights.
III. DRAFTING LEGISLATION: AN AMERICAN ANTI-MODEL
As the conversation shifted from writing a constitution to drafting legis-
lation, South African advocates focused on removing restrictions on how,
when, and which women could decide to have abortions. This approach, as
discussed above, draws from a developing consensus in human rights law
about the importance of legal abortion in protecting women's health, eradi-
cating sexism, and improving women's status."' This Part illustrates how
reproductive rights reform projects, and the international principles that
underpin them, transplant the American experience of abortion law and
politics in interesting and indirect ways.1 12
the freedom to make decisions without govemment interference).
105. See David Kennedy, The International Human Rights Movement: Part of the Problem?, 15
HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 101, 109-10 (2002).
106. CTOPA, pmbl.
107. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, ch. 1, §§ 27, 27(2).
108. CTOPA, pmbl.; CTOPA.
109. See Kennedy, supra note 105, at 108.
110. Siegel, Roe's Roots, supra note 33, at 1879.
111. Cook & Howard, supra note 33, at 1055-56.
112. Cf Gerald L. Neuman, Casey in the Mirror: Abortion, Abuse and the Right to Protection in the
United States and Germany, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 273 (1995) (describing how American abortion deci-
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A. What Drafters Wanted
The scope of U.S. influence in the diffusion of rights has been the sub-
ject of varied attention,'"3 particularly in scholarship examining how an
American rights-based system of adjudication helped fortify an international
human rights culture.'1 4 Human rights advocacy in promoting autonomy,
equality, choice, and secularism draws support from American legal tradi-
tions that promote formal equality and non-discrimination." 5 Significant
research, notably in the field of law and development, details the impact of
U.S. policies in law reform projects designed to open markets in a global
economy,'l6 resulting in changes to law on the books but not necessarily in
transformation of localized or community practices." 7
As noted, the ICPD marked an important conceptual change from regu-
lating population, environment, and fertility issues to promoting rights of
individual well-being and gender equality." 8 U.S. activists and organiza-
tions promoting reproductive rights played an important role in the devel-
opment of an international movement and specifically in the drafting of the
ICPD and FWCW documents.119 In 1994, a representative of the Depart-
ment of State set out the United States' position on the ICPD Programme
for Action:
sions have been a subject of comparative constitutional law).
113. TAUB, supra note 84, at 9, 12.
114. Heinz Klug, Model and Anti-Model: The United States Constitution and the "Rise of World
Constitutionalism," 2000 Wis. L. REV. 597, 599; see also Duncan Kennedy, Three Globalizations of
Law and Legal Thought: 1850-2000, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL
APPRAISAL (David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006) (describing the role of U.S. constitutional-
ism, rights balancing, and policy analysis as the basis of modern globalization and diffusion of law).
115. See, e.g., Sally Engle Merry, New Legal Realism and the Ethnography of Transnational Law, 31
L. & SOC. INQUIRY 975 (2006); Richard Goldstone, Ambiguity and America: South Africa and U.S.
Foreign Policy, 72 Soc. RES. I (2005) (noting the role of Brown v. Board of Education, for example, in
inspiring racial equality advocates across the world and especially in South Africa).
116. See, e.g., David Kennedy, The Mystery of Global Governance, 34 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 827, 829
(2008) ("At the same time, ideas about economics and law and political affairs developed in the United
States have had an enormous impact on the world in the last half century. Unfortunately, we have often
been far better at exporting our main ideas than the qualifications and critical traditions with which they
arose."). See also Laura Nader, The Americanization ofInternational Law, in MOBILE PEOPLE, MOBILE
LAW: EXPANDING LEGAL RELATIONS IN A CONTRACTING WORLD 207-08 (Franz von Benda-Beckmann
et al. eds., 2005) (criticizing rule of law projects, supported and funded by American organizations and
the government of the United States, for promoting regulations that support market-based democracy but
may create an economic infrastructure in developing nations that can be exploited by other countries).
117. See, e.g., Ugo Mattei, A Theory of Imperial Law: A Study on U.S. Hegemony and the Latin
Resistance, 10 IND. J. GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 383, 389-90 (2003); Francis G. Snyder, Governing Globali-
zation, in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESSES: GLOBALIZATION AND POWER DISPARITIES 65-67 (Mi-
chael Likosky ed., 2002) (highlighting the role of legal pluralism in globalization).
118. FAMILY PLANNING COAL., supra note 80, at 2. U.S. thinkers were also concerned with how
population control policies, abortion laws included, could help protect environmental resources. Linda
Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel, Before (and After) Roe v. Wade: New Questions about Backlash, 120
YALE L.J. 2028, 2038 (2011).
119. Julia L. Ernst et al., The Global Pattern of U.S. Initiatives Curtailing Women's Reproductive
Rights: A Perspective on the Increasingly Anti-Choice Mosaic, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 752, 763-64, 785
(2004).
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[A]dvancing the roles and rights of women is a critical common
thread that must be woven through the recommendations and im-
plementation of our goals from [the ICPD and FWCW] .... [Sus-
tainable development] cannot be realized when women are denied
the choices that spring from access to a full range of primary and
reproductive health care services. 12 0
The constitutional protection of privacy in Roe v. Wade1 2 1 provided a
catalyst for refraining procreative decisions in terms of autonomy and
equality rights. 12 2 Roe "both informed and was informed by a larger global
movement to recognize reproductive health and self-determination as
integral components of women's equality." 2 3 This role for Roe, however,
may be more symbolic than it is a jurisprudential template. Many have
noted that the decision itself did not make extensive reference to autonomy
or equality rights.124 Rather, the influence of Roe extended beyond its text
by setting the stage for a rights approach to reproductive health issues. 12 5
Although the basis of Roe is a judicial interpretation of constitutional rights,
the decision encouraged legislative changes to liberalize abortion laws
across the world. 12 6
The CTOPA adopts a trimester approach inspired by Roe v. Wade be-
cause, as recounted by one South African activist, Roe is grounded in "the
right to freedom, dignity and autonomy of the woman." 2 7 Drafters also
wanted to acknowledge the "changing moral attitudes of women towards
developing fetal life" in the structure of the CTOPA. 128 The first proposal
ARAG drafted allowed abortion for any reason in the first fourteen weeks
of pregnancy, and from week fourteen to twenty-four under certain condi-
120. TAUB, supra note 84, at 12-13 (citing Timothy E. Wirth, Counselor, U.S. Dep't of State, Ad-
dress to Citizens of Cairo, Trusteeship Council Chamber (Mar. 30, 1994)).
121. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
122. Ernst et al., supra note 119, at 755, 760.
123. Id. at 753.
124. Many articles have examined the constitutional foundations of Roe v. Wade and, relevant to the
point made here, have noted that the decision does not necessarily ground the privacy rights in terms
women's equality or autonomy. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in
Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375 (1985); see also Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A
Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV.
261, 348-78 (1992).
125. Reed Boland & Laura Katzive, Developments in Laws on Induced Abortion: 1998-2007, 34
INT'L FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 110, 117 (2008) ("[Thirty-six] countries have significantly liberalized their
abortion laws.. . . [since Roe because of] the use of human rights principles to support a woman's right
to [an] abortion.").
126. See CTR. FOR REPROD. RIGHTS., ROE v. WADE AND THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY 54-58 (3d ed.
2003), available at
http://reproductiverights.org/sites/crr.civicactions.net/files/documents/roeprivacy_0.pdf. See also Naomi
Cahn & Anne T. Goldstein, Roe and Its Global Impact: The Constitution, Reproductive Rights, and
Feminism, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 695 (2004).
127. CTR. FOR REPROD. RIGHTS, THIRTY FACES OF ROE: INTERNATIONAL VOICES (2006) [hereinafter
CTR. FOR REPROD. RIGHTS, THIRTY FACES OF ROE] (quoting Catherine Albertyn) (on file with author).
128. UN INT'L RESEARCH AND TRAINING INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF WOMEN, supra note 35,
at 204.
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tions, which included protecting the health of the woman and fetus, age,
socio-economic reasons, and family size.129
Working in coalition as the Reproductive Rights Alliance, women's
rights and civil rights advocates exerted substantial influence over the legis-
lative process. The final version of the CTOPA, for example, retains the
structure and most of the substance of the ARAG draft. The influence of the
Reproductive Rights Alliance was also evident in the public consultation on
the new abortion law conducted by the ANC's ad hoc Committee on Abor-
tion and Sterilisation.130 Although a number of public submissions (mostly
on the behalf of national and international NGOs) supported the bill,"' the
majority of the submissions made to the Committee were opposed to abor-
tion.13 2 The Committee discounted many of these because "most of [the
submissions opposing abortion] were from individuals and small bodies,
especially religious organizations," whereas "[tlhe submissions [supporting
abortion]. . . came from a broad[er] range of civil society." 3 3 Reproductive
rights advocates thwarted attempts by abortion opponents to argue for legis-
lative recognition of fetal rights. Instead, the Reproductive Rights Alliance
persuaded Parliament to replace the 1975 Act with legislation expressly
grounded in women's rights.' 3 4 The Committee recommended to the Portfo-
lio Committee of the Department of Health (the committee responsible for
drafting the legislation) that the 1975 Act be repealed and that the new bill
include ARAG's proposal of a right to abortion until the fourteenth week of
gestation with only informed consent of the patient required.135
Ultimately, advocates got most, but not all, of what they wanted: as
amended in parliamentary debates, the final version of the CTOPA allows
abortion for any reason until twelve, rather than fourteen, weeks of preg-
nancy.136 The final version of the bill retained broad grounds for abortion in
the second trimester (including when continued pregnancy would "signifi-
cantly affect the social or economic circumstances of the woman"). 37 After
twenty weeks, women may elect abortion with the advice of two medical
practitioners or a medical practitioner and midwife if continued pregnancy
129. At a major conference hosted by the Women's Health Project, the ARAG drafi became the basis
of the policy statement adopted by the delegates in 1994. Id. at 204-05.
130. Women's rights groups (both local and affiliates of transnational organizations that worked
together in the constitution-drafting process), academics, and civil rights organizations formed the Re-
productive Rights Alliance to lobby the Committee and to provide it with resources and expertise. Id. at
208-09.
131. Id. at 209.
132. Id.
133. Id. (noting "[a] significant gap in submissions from black people and community based organi-
zations, which had difficulty in accessing Parliament").
134. Id.
135. [d. at 210.
136. Id. at 222.
137. CTOPA § 2(1) (stating that, from thirteen to twenty weeks of gestation, a medical practitioner in
consultation with the patient must determine if there is a risk of injury to the woman's physical or mental
health, severe fetal abnormality, or significant harm to the social and economic circumstances of the
woman).
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would endanger the woman's life, result in "a severe malformation of the
fetus," or pose a risk of injury to the fetus. 38
B. What Drafters Sought to Avoid
The influence of human rights and of the United States is evident in the
issues the drafters of the CTOPA decided to take off the table. As stated by
a leader of the Reproductive Rights Alliance: "Reproductive rights advo-
cates in South Africa learned from the U.S. abortion rights movement's
mistakes as well as from its successes. .. ."139 Kim Lane Scheppele de-
scribes this comparative method of law reform as "knowing who you are by
knowing what you are not" or the process of rejecting the practices of
another country by drafting legislative language meant to preclude undesir-
able outcomes.14 0 In the same vein, Heinz Klug described the United States
as an "anti-model,"' 4 1 elaborating, "by and large United States jurispru-
dence has been increasingly used as a counter-example, as a source of dis-
tinction, or merely distinguished as inapposite." 4 2
As Roe inspired legislative reform in countries that liberalized abortion
law, the decision also played a part in inciting opposition to abortion in the
United States' 43 and in other countries. Anti-abortion activism revolved
around defining personhood at conception or conferring constitutional pro-
tections on the fetus.144 In many ways, abortion opponents have been suc-
cessful: abortion law in the United States changed significantly after Roe. 4 5
By the time of the CTOPA's drafting, American states had passed numerous
laws that restricted the right to abortion.14 6 Parental involvement laws, pro-
tections for health professional refusals, regulation of abortion providers
and facilities, and state-mandated counseling (in some instances intended to
dissuade women from abortion) are examples of laws that regulate when
and how to obtain an abortion.147 Underpinning legal restrictions on abor-
138. Id. § 2(1)(c).
139. CTR. FOR REPROD. RIGHTS, THIRTY FACES OF ROE, supra note 127 (quoting Catherine Alber-
tyn).
140. Kim Lane Scheppele, Aspirational and Aversive Constitutionalism: The Case for Studying
Cross-Constitutional Influence Through Negative Models, I INT'L J. CONST. L. 296, 300, 303-05
(2003).
141. Klug, supra note 114, at 599, 604-12 (describing a model as a "source of ideas, concepts, ex-
amples, and even specific constitutional arguments").
142. Id. at 607.
143. Cf Greenhouse & Siegel, supra note 1l8, at 2074 (contesting that Roe caused "backlash" be-
cause of "bad judicial decisionmaking," which has been criticized for overreaching, preventing compro-
mise, or nationalizing the discussion over abortion).
144. See Ernst et al., supra note 119, at 761.
145. This Article does not purport to review, in depth, the many developments in U.S. abortion and
reproductive health law since Roe in 1973. For a more fulsome treatment of U.S. law governing abor-
tion, see THE REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS READER: LAW, MEDICINE, AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF
MOTHERHOOD (Nancy Ehrenreich ed., 2008).
146. Ernst et al., supra note 119, at 771-73.
147. On a monthly basis, the Guttmacher Institute lists and summarizes various state laws that restrict
abortion access, including the 36 state laws requiring parental involvement, the 46 allowing individual
health care providers to refuse abortion care, the 43 allowing institutions to refuse to perform abortions,
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tions is the rejection of the premise that liberalized abortion leads to im-
provements in women's health or equality. 148
The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Planned Parent-
hood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey in 1992 upheld abortion re-
strictions related to parental consent, a waiting period, record keeping and
reporting duties, and pro-childbirth counseling information, but struck down
the requirement of spousal consent.14 9 Although Casey preserved constitu-
tional protection for abortion, the decision rejected Roe's trimester frame-
work and gave states more discretion in restricting abortion services and
extending protections for fetal life.150 The Court held that states could limit
abortion access so long as the state does not create an "undue burden" on
the woman's decision to have an abortion.'5 1 Rather than overturn Roe, the
Court's undue burden standard upholds state laws that make abortions cost-
ly and logistically difficult.152
Challenging principles that have gained considerable support in interna-
tional human rights law, American policies restricting abortion extended
their influence internationally and reflected the divisiveness of the U.S.
abortion debate. Although the U.S. government took a crucial role in form-
ing the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and was the largest con-
tributor for the first decade of its existence, 153 in 2002 the United States
reversed positions by de-funding UNFPA. 15 4 The Bush Administration ar-
gued that the phrases "reproductive rights" or "reproductive health services"
were proxies for abortion and that any mention of the reproductive rights of
adolescents would encourage underage sex.s The now-rescinded "global
the 24 requiring a waiting period and 19 requiring counseling, and the 39 prohibiting abortion after a
certain point in pregnancy. See GUTTMACHER INST., STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: AN OVERVIEW OF
ABORTION LAWS 1-3 (2011), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib OAL.pdf.
148. See, e.g., James Gathii, Exporting Culture Wars, 13 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 67, 70, 79
(2006). In the American context, Robert Post and Reva Siegel characterized opposition to legalized
abortion as a "vision that is intensely concerned . . . about the role of women, sex, family, and religion in
American life." Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373, 377 (2007).
149. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
150. See id. at 846 (summarizing holding).
151. Id. at 897-901.
152. See Linda J. Wharton et al., Preserving the Core ofRoe: Reflections on Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 18 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 317, 319-21 (2006). Whether a state could ban abortion before viabili-
ty has yet to be tested in the Supreme Court, although states have attempted to pass pre-viability bans to
trigger just such a review. See S.D. Initiative Petition 11 (proposed Dec. 14, 2007) (measure that would
have banned all abortions in South Dakota, with exceptions for rape, incest, to save a woman's life or to
avert a "substantial and irreversible" maternal health risk of impairment to "a major bodily organ or
system"), available at http://ppsd.3cdn.net/6c52965874d08286b2_3ym6bhh22.pdf. As of June 2011, six
states (Alabama, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Nebraska, and Oklahoma) passed legislation forbidding abor-
tion after twenty weeks, which is usually before viability, unless the pregnant woman's life was in dan-
ger or there was risk of "serious physical impairment of a major bodily function." Erik Eckholm, New
Laws in 6 States Ban Abortion After 20 Weeks, N.Y.TIMES, June 27, 2011, at Al0.
153. Chad M. Gerson, Toward an International Standard ofAbortion Rights: Two Obstacles, 5 CHI.
J. INT'L L. 753, 760 (2005).
154. See Press Release, Population Action Int'l, PAI Appalled by White House Decision to Deny
UNFPA Funds (July 22, 2002), available at http://www.planetwire.org/details/2981.
155. See Gathii, supra note 148, at 89.
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gag rule" (or the Mexico City Policy) prohibited recipients of U.S. foreign
aid, such as NGOs working for women's rights outside of the United States,
to perform abortions unless there was a threat to the woman's life, rape, or
incest; provide counseling or referral for abortion; or lobby for liberalized
abortion laws. 156
At the same time, international women's rights activists concentrated on
translating reproductive rights into human rights on the global stage."'7 This
activism influenced the drafters of the CTOPA, who feared transplanting or
inciting the intensity of the U.S. debate on abortion policies. For example,
the CTOPA promotes non-directive, non-mandatory counseling before and
after a termination, which responded in part to the informed consent laws of
the United States that require options counseling-information a woman
must review or hear that can be intended to dissuade women from terminat-
ing a pregnancy. 15 8
South African advocates also deployed their lobbying power to defeat
amendments that would have restricted access to abortion in the ways that
the state laws upheld by Casey did. When the Portfolio Committee called
for written submissions and organized public hearings on the proposed leg-
islation, 159 advocates directed their energy to defeating amendments that
would have conditioned abortion access on factors other than the women's
informed consent.16 0 The Reproductive Rights Alliance argued against the
inclusion of mandatory counseling for minors in the Committee's draft and
tried to diffuse public pressure for a parental involvement requirement.161
Certainly important to this campaign was the American experience of pa-
rental consent and notice for minors' abortions. 162 Advocates were mindful
of research documenting the emotional, physical, and financial costs of re-
quiring consent from potentially absent, unsupportive, or abusive parents.1 6 3
156. Ernst et al., supra note 119, at 774-75, 786-87.
157. Id. at 755, 790; see also Gathii, supra note 148.
158. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 883 (1992) (stating that counseling information
may contain information "which might cause the woman to choose childbirth over abortion"). Moreover,
several states require information that is biased or wrong: "in 4 states, the written materials inaccurately
portray [the] risk [to future fertility]"; 6 states "inaccurately assert a link between abortion and an in-
creased risk of breast cancer"; "7 of the 19 states that include information on possible psychological
responses to abortion describe only negative emotional responses." See GUTTMACHER INST., STATE
POLICIES IN BRIEF: COUNSELING AND WAITING PERIODS FOR ABORTION 1-2 (2011), available at
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib MWPA.pdf.
159. UN INT'L RESEARCH AND TRAINING INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF WOMEN, supra note 35,
at 208-09.
160. Like the CTOPA, the ARAG draft originally proposed that minors be advised but not required
to have counseling. Id. at 205 (citing a pamphlet from the Women's Health Conference Policy on Abor-
tion).
161. Id. at 210-ll.
162. See generally GUTTMACHER INST., STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: PARENTAL INVOLVEMENT IN
MINORS' ABORTIONS (2011), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib PIMA.pdf.
163. For a discussion of the varying consequences of and problems with parental involvement laws in
the United States, see generally HELENA SILVERSTEIN, GIRLS ON THE STAND: How COURTS FAIL
PREGNANT MINORS (2007) (studying the implementation of parental involvement laws in Alabama,
Pennsylvania, and Tennessee); J. SHOSHANNA EHRLICH, WHO DECIDES?: THE ABORTION RIGHTS OF
TEENS (2006) (interviewing minors about their experiences navigating parental consent and notice laws).
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In the same way, the CTOPA purposefully omitted conscientious objec-
tion rights for health professionals. 164 An earlier version of the CTOPA pro-
vided that "no person shall be under any legal duty ... to participate in the
termination of a pregnancy if he or she has a conscientious objection to the
termination of the pregnancy."l 65 The Reproductive Rights Alliance fought
to eliminate the refusal clause from the bill, in part because its members
were cognizant of debates about conscientious objection in the United
States and elsewhere. 166 The Church Amendments, passed in the 1970s,
allowed hospitals or health care providers to refuse to provide abortion,
contraceptive services, or sterilization.16 7 The amendments made clear that
health care providers receiving federal funds were not obligated to provide
abortions if "contrary to [their] religious beliefs or moral convictions."l68
Concurrently with the drafting and passage of the CTOPA, Section 245 of
the Public Health Services Act of 1996 (or Coats Amendment) 16 9 brought
the issue to the forefront of U.S. public attention. Section 245 created a right
to non-discrimination for those health care entities that refused to offer or to
require training for abortion services. 170 The extent to which drafters actual-
ly succeeded in neutralizing the debate on refusals, as well as parental in-
volvement, is the focus of the next Part.
C. Early Challenges to the CTOPA
The final version of the CTOPA passed in November 1996 by a vote of
209 to 87.171 Advocates could have challenged the 1975 Act in court under
the new Constitution, as other laws from the apartheid era were. Instead,
164. Charles Ngwena, Conscientious Objection and Legal Abortion in South Africa: Delineating the
Parameters, 28 J. JURIDICAL SCIENCE 1, 9 (2003) [hereinafter Ngwena, Conscientious Objection].
165. Termination of Pregnancy Bill, 1996, Bill 80-96, § 8, available at http://us-
cdn.creamermedia.co.za/assets/articles/attachments/03832_termofpergb80-1996.pdf (last visited Sep-
tember 6, 2011).
166. Ngwena, Conscientious Objection, supra note 164, at 8-9.
167. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300a-7(b),(c)(1),(c)(2),(d),(e) (2006).
168. See, e.g., id § 300a-7(b)(1).
169. 42 U.S.C. § 238n (2006).
170. The issue of conscientious objection in the United States has been the subject of recent public
debate. In late 2008, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) under the Bush Adminis-
tration issued a rule interpreting the federal regulation of refusals. Ensuring That Department of Health
and Human Services Funds Do Not Support Coercive or Discriminatory Policies or Practices in Viola-
tion of Federal Law, 73 Fed. Reg. 78,072 (Dec. 19, 2008) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 88). Abortion
supporters criticized the regulations for including a medically inaccurate definition of abortion that
"conflate[s] most modem contraceptives with abortion." Adam Sonfield, For the Record: Obama Ad-
ministration Rescinds Most of Controversial 'Conscience' Regulation, GUTTMACHER POL'Y REV.,
Winter 2011, at 24. However, in 2011, the DHHS rescinded and revised the 2008 regulations. While the
DHHS still "supports clear and strong conscience protections for health care providers who are opposed
to performing abortions," it "rescind[ed] those parts of the 2008 Final Rule that were unclear and poten-
tially overbroad in scope." Regulation for the Enforcement of Federal Health Care Provider Conscience
Protection Laws, 76 Fed. Reg. 9,968, 9,969 (Feb. 23, 2011) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 88).
171. The ANC resisted pressure from members to allow a conscience vote and, instead, voted collec-
tively. However, it has been noted that had the ANC allowed a conscience vote, rather than using the
party whip, the CTOPA might not have passed in its current form (or at all). Haroz, supra note 6, at 886;
Guttmacher et al., supra note 33, at 193.
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advocates pressed for a statutory right to abortion, the drafting of which
they could shape and would avoid court interpretation of what a right to
abortion included. 172 As noted, the then-recent Casey decision-and the
concern that the Supreme Court of the United States would overturn Roe,
which preceded the Casey decision-was very much on the minds of draf-
ters of the CTOPA.173 A lawyer involved in the drafting stated:
We were aware of how precarious it might be to use the courts to
establish the right to abortion. In that sense, Roe was a lesson, be-
cause we had seen people consistently trying to take Roe v. Wade
back to court and chip away at the right. We spent a lot of time try-
ing to keep the abortion issue out of the courts, so that we could
first get a law in place, and we could get women's protection
through a law that we could then defend in court. So, in a sense, we
were reacting to what we thought was a problem in the U.S. 17 4
Returning to the U.S. law as an "anti-model,"175 Klug argues that the
first court challenge to the CTOPA demonstrated the success of an approach
that avoids American-associated outcomes. 176 For example, in the first of
two cases discussed in this Part, the then Transvaal High Court dismissed
the claim that Section 11 of the Constitution, which guarantees the right to
life, applies at conception.177 As Klug explains, the court avoided relying on
a right to privacy and instead referred to common law definitions of when
life begins to determine that a fetus is not a rights-bearer under the South
African Constitution.
The two courts that have dismissed challenges to the constitutionality of
the substance of the CTOPA in 1998 and 2004 cite to Roe and U.S. academ-
ics to support the legislation. 179 What the decisions appear to frame as an
anti-model are the U.S. controversies that surround abortion. But, in es-
sence, they reframe Roe as emblematic of a women's rights approach. The
anti-model is what Roe actually said, not what it now stands for: "Roe was
172. See supra Part III.A (describing what drafters wanted to include in the CTOPA).
173. See supra Part 111.B (describing what drafters sought to exclude from the CTOPA).
174. CTR. FOR REPROD. RIGHTS, THIRTY FACES OF ROE, supra note 127 ("We consciously chose the
law reform route, rather than going through the courts to secure the right.") (quoting Catherine Alber-
tyn).
175. Klug, supra note 114, at 598 (describing a "source of ideas and an outsider to a growing transna-
tional constitutional conversation"). Klug offers another example of an "anti-model" by describing how
drafters of the South African Constitution created a right to just compensation but only for arbitrary
deprivation in order to block courts from developing a doctrine of regulatory takings or inverse condem-
nation like that in the United States. Id. at 606-07.
176. Id. at 612.
177. Christian Lawyers Assn of SA and Others v. Minister of Health and Others 1998 (11) BCLR
1434 (T) at 1436 (S. Afr.) [hereinafter Christian Lawyers l].
178. Klug, supra note 114, at 612 ("[E]ven in an area of law in which the United States Supreme
Court clearly led the way internationally, its recognition of a women's right to make a choice within the
realm of personal privacy has been essentially ignored and framed as an alternative or anti-model.").
179. Christian Lawyers I, supra note 177, at 1444; Christian Lawyers' Ass'n v. National Minister of
Health and Others 2004 (10) BCLR 1086 (T) at 1099 (S. Afr.) [hereinafter Christian Lawyers Il].
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at best a transitional decision that straddled the medical and women's rights
models. Women's advocacy helped establish women as constitutional rights
holders who are entitled to make decisions about sex and parenting without
control by the state - but Roe gave only confused expression to this
right."i80
The first case decided in 1998, Christian Lawyers Association v. Minis-
ter ofHealth (Christian Lawyers 1), cites to Roe to illustrate an international
consensus that a fetus does not have a constitutional right to life because
granting that right would infringe on women's rights to equality and securi-
ty of person.'8 ' Although the court analyzes the personhood rights of fetuses
under South African common law, it ultimately bases it judgment on an
interpretation of the South African Constitution. 82 The court supports its
interpretative method by noting the same analysis of the term "person" un-
der the U.S. Constitution.183 In particular, the court highlights, and then
notes similar argumentation in Roe, that a right to life for a fetus would
mean that all abortions-even terminations to save a woman's life-would
be unconstitutional. 18 4 Such an interpretation would be stricter than permit-
ted by the 1975 Act (and pre-Roe state laws), which allowed abortion for
reason of threat to life.185 To reiterate "the finding that the foetus is not a
person and does not enjoy a constitutional right to life has been generally
accepted [globally]," the court quotes an excerpt of the book Life's Domi-
nion by Ronald Dworkin.' 86
The same theme emerges in the second case challenging the constitutio-
nality of the CTOPA decided in 2004. After reviewing South African com-
mon law on informed consent, the court in Christian Lawyers Association v.
Minister of Health (Christian Lawyers II), a challenge to minors' access to
abortion without parental consent, quotes from Roe to demonstrate support
for a "right [of a woman] to determine the fate of her own pregnancy."' 8 7
The Supreme Court of Appeal cites Casey as "affirm[ing] the essential find-
ings of Roe including the principle that women have a constitutional right to
determine the fate of their own pregnancy."' 88
180. Siegel, Roe's Roots, supra note 33, at 1897.
181. Christian Lawyers I, supra note 177, at 1444. Judge McCreath held that the drafters of the
Constitution purposely excluded rights for the fetus. Id. at 1444; see Sujit Choudbry, Globalization in
Search ofJustification: Toward a Theory ofComparative Constitutional Interpretation, 74 IND. L.J. 819,
833-39, 841-46 (1999) (setting out categories of reasons on which courts rely to legitimate their use of
foreign law; noting South Africa's use of foreign law is at times to promote a universalist approach).
182. Christian Lawyers I, supra note 177, at 1442-43.
183. Id. at 1444.
184. Id
185. Id. at 1443-44.
186. Id. at 1444.
187. Christian Lawyers II, supra note 179, at 1099. Interestingly, the court again cites Ronald Dwor-
kin's, Life's Dominion, for "the court's conclusion that the Constitution protects the woman's freedom to
determine the fate of her own pregnancy." Id. at I100.
188. Id. at 1100. The decision fails to mention that, specifically related to minors' access to abortion,
Casey upheld a parental involvement law that required the consent of a parent before a minor's abortion.
The pattern of citing American caselaw as proof of an emerging consensus toward liberalization and in
ways that ignore subsequent developments is not unique to the South African courts. Rachel Rebouch6,
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But Christian Lawyers I and II describe abortion jurisprudence from
another era, which is perhaps unsurprising. The CTOPA itself took Roe as
its model and rejected the types of regulations upheld by U.S. courts that cut
against a right to abortion. A strategy built around the rejection of law
carries with it definitional limits and assumptions. Robin West has written
about the unintended consequences of the Roe legacy, highlighting in par-
ticular what privacy and autonomy rights cannot accomplish in the United
States-in West's account, better choices for caregivers and a just social
welfare system.' 90 The assessment of costs is apt here, but not just in terms
of the limits of courts' judicial review powers and of negative rights to ac-
complish redistributive ends.
Roe has not been a ready platform for thinking about abortion in terms
of women's right to health care. 191 Many scholars note how U.S. legislators
increasingly ignore concerns with women's health in the abortion context, 19 2
unless expressed in terms of how abortion may harm women.1 9 3 One could
look at the marginalization of abortion as a health care service in the 2009
debate on American health care reform and in the subsequent Patient Pro-
tection and Affordable Care Act of 2010194 as examples. Whether abortion
would be included in benefit plans offered by new state health care ex-
changes, which individuals could purchase with the help of federal subsi-
dies, was controversial for bills introduced in the House and the Senate, as
well as the reconciliation bill approved by Congress and signed by President
Obama. 19 5 The final Act excludes abortion as an essential benefit in the
Comparative Method in Rights Reform (Nov. 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
189. See supra pp. 25-26.
190. Robin West, From Choice to Reproductive Justice: De-Constitutionalizing Abortion Rights, 118
YALE L.J. 1394, 1409-10, 1423 (2009).
191. B. Jessie Hill, Reproductive Rights as Health Care Rights, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 501, 507,
510-11 (2008) (noting that although Roe was written in the "medical model"-a negative right to non-
governmental interference in a medical decision made by a physician and pregnant woman-it does not
suggest that women have a positive right to receive reproductive health care).
192. See, e.g., Hilary Hammell, Is the Right to Health a Necessary Precondition for Gender Equali-
ty?, 35 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 131, 166 (2011) (arguing that in passing anti-abortion legisla-
tion, legislators "are permitted to focus on the fetus, or the abstract question of 'whether and if to pro-
create, rather than on the health implications for the woman whose body is directly and seriously af-
fected by pregnancy and abortion").
193. For example, in 2007, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a federal law that barred physicians from
using a particular abortion procedure popularly known as partial birth abortion and clinically described
as intact dilation and extraction. The subject of the challenge was the law's failure to include an excep-
tion for when the procedure would be necessary to protect a woman's health. The Court held that evi-
dence did not conclusively establish that the procedure was necessary (in comparison with other availa-
ble procedures) to protect the pregnant woman's health. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 165-66
(2007). This holding has been criticized for ignoring the opinion of medical experts that testified about
the safety and health benefits of the banned procedure for women and for overly emphasizing emotional
harm that abortion may cause women. Priscilla J. Smith, Responsibility for Life: How Abortion Serves
Women's Interests in Motherhood, 17 J.L. & POL'Y 97, 141-42 (2008); see also Pamela S. Karlan, The
Law of Small Numbers: Gonzales v. Carhart, Parents Involved in Community Schools, and Some
Themes from the First Full Term of the Roberts Court, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1369, 1382-84 (2008).
194. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010). The Act
also prohibits plans from discriminating against any physician participant that is unwilling to provide
abortion care.
195. For brief summary of the Congressional debate over abortion in health care reform, see Susan
24 [Vol.63: 1:1
HeinOnline  -- 63 Ala. L. Rev. 24 2011-2012
The Limits of Reproductive Rights
package of health care benefits that insurance plans participating in state
exchanges must cover.' 9 6 State exchange plans may offer abortion coverage
but must comply with segregation rules that ensure no federal money subsi-
dizes that care.197 For example, insurers must offer at least one plan that
does not cover abortion,'98 and, for plans that cover abortion, the insurance
company must collect two premiums from all of the plan's members-one
for abortion benefits and one for everything else.199 State insurance com-
missions will oversee the separate accounts into which insurance companies
must deposit payments for abortion benefits.200
The South African experience of implementing the CTOPA demon-
strates the value of imprinting the details of health care delivery on a legis-
lative strategy for securing abortion rights. This would inevitably present
challenges given the myriad of health priorities and different infrastructure
needs of any country. But a legislative strategy designed to address imple-
mentation obstacles at the point of enactment might help de-stigmatize
abortion services in the long run.
Advocates and legislators supporting the CTOPA succeeded in estab-
lishing abortion as a legal right. However, that effort may not incorporate
the tools necessary to pursue legislation that meets the reproductive health
needs of women.2 0 1 The next Part considers how the influence of U.S. law
on drafters may have limited the scope and purpose of reproductive health
reform through an analysis of the shortcomings of the CTOPA's implemen-
tation. Mapping these problems reveals that some of the controversies draf-
ters sought to avoid erupted anyway and that challenges the drafters perhaps
Cohen, Insurance Coverage of Abortion: The Battle to Date and the Battle to Come, GUTTMACHER
POL'Y REv., Fall 2010, at 2-4. For a summary of the text of the bills debated in Congress, see KAISER
FAMILY FOUND., Focus ON HEALTH REFORM: HEALTH CARE REFORM PROPOSALS (2009), available at
http://www.kff.org/healthreform/ upload/ healthreform tri full.pdf.
196. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1303(a)(1)(A)(i), 124 Stat.
119, 168 (2010).
197. Id. § 1303(a)(1)(B)(i).
198. Id. § 1303(a)(1)(D)(i)(Il).
199. Id. § 1303(a)(2)(B). The cost of the abortion benefit must be at least one dollar per enrollee per
month. Id. § 1303(a)(2)(C)(ii)(Ill).
200. Since passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, fifteen states have
passed laws prohibiting insurance companies participating in state exchanges from offering coverage for
abortion services; another fifteen have proposed such laws. Karmah Elmusa, Map of the Day: States
Banning Abortion Coverage, MOTHER JONES, June 29, 2011,
http://www.motherjones.com/mojo/2011/06/map-state-abortion-coverage-ban. In 2011, the House of
Representatives passed the "No Taxpayer Funding for Abortion Act," which did not move forward in the
Senate. The bill prevents employers from taking a tax deduction for insurance plans that include abortion
coverage and prevents individuals from paying for plans that cover abortion with pretax dollars or using
a flexible health spending account to pay for abortion care or claiming medical care deduction from
federal taxes. No Taxpayer Funding for Abortion Act, H.R. 3, 112th Cong. (2011). More recently, the
House passed the "Protect Life Act," which, among other things, amends the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act to prohibit funds from covering any costs of any health plan that offers coverage of
abortion services. The Protect Life Act H.R. 358, 112th Cong. (2011).
201. Andrews, Striking the Rock, supra note 63, at 318-19, 338; see Chad M. Gerson, Toward an
International Standard of Abortion Rights: Empirical Data from Africa, 18 PACE INT'L L. REV. 373,
387-88 (2006) (arguing that the movement to define a right to abortion as a human right is distinctly
"Western").
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did not anticipate became substantial impediments to realizing the
CTOPA's goals.
IV. CHALLENGES OF THE CTOPA's IMPLEMENTATION
It is not for lack of political will that the implementation of the CTOPA
has been problematic.202 The ANC supported the CTOPA by publicizing
widely the importance of safe abortion for all South African women.203 Yet
the extent to which the CTOPA has led to improvements in women's access
to reproductive health services is unclear. For example, some studies have
found that legal and illegal abortion-related deaths have decreased,204 esti-
mating that rates of maternal mortality decreased by almost half in the two
years following the CTOPA.205 However, a study conducted over 2005 to
2007, the Saving Mothers Report, found an increase in avoidable, abortion-
related deaths.206
The number of women with illness or disease resulting from abortion
has not decreased significantly.207 And data on the number of illegal abor-
tions post-passage of the CTOPA is troubling: studies in 2000 and 2009
suggest a fairly constant rate of illegal abortion-or terminations performed
outside of designated facilities or by unapproved persons.208
Moreover, attitudes about abortion remain largely mixed or negative.
There continues to be considerable social stigma associated with abortion.
In Christian Lawyers I, petitioners argued that the majority of South Afri-
cans opposed abortion and believed in life at conception, which is a claim
about public attitudes that carries some weight. 209 In KwaZulu-Natal, for
example, forty-eight percent of those surveyed said abortion was morally
wrong and forty-one percent believed it was justifiable only in the case of
rape; only ten percent believed it was a woman's right. 210 Arguably, because
of the stigma associated with abortion, women report that they fear judg-
202. The politics of ANC President Zuma, whose conservative, religious base has pressured him to
reconsider abortion or other legislation, may signal change in ANC support. See Mandy Rossouw, Zu-
ma 's New God Squad Wants Liberal Laws to Go, MAIL & GUARDIAN, Sept. 11, 2009,
http://mg.co.za/article/2009-09-11-zumas-new-god-squad-wants-liberal-laws-to-go (noting that Presi-
dent Zuma's Christian supporters are pressing for the repeal of abortion and same-sex marriage laws).
203. See, e.g., Manto Tshabalala-Msimang, Minister of Health, Speech: The Saving Mothers Report
on Confidential Enquiries into Maternal Deaths in South Africa (Sept. 19, 2006).
204. Margaret Hoffman et al., The Status of Legal Termination of Pregnancy in South Africa, 96 S.
AFR. MED. J. 1056, 1056 (2006).
205. Cooper et al., Ten Years, supra note 35, at 75.
206. Bateman, supra note 11, at 302.
207. Rachel Jewkes et al., Prevalence of Morbidity Associated with Abortion Before and After Lega-
lisation in South Africa, 324 BRIT. MED. J. 1252, 1252 (2002) (study revealed that there were 362 in-
complete abortions per 100,000 women in 2000 as compared to 375 in 1994).
208. Rachel Jewkes et al., The Impact of Age on the Epidemiology of Incomplete Abortions in South
Africa after Legislative Change, 112 BRIT. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNAECOLOGY 355, 356-57 (2005); Meel
& Kaswa, supra note 10, at 79-80.
209. Christian Lawyers I, supra note 177; see also Denise Meyerson, Abortion: The Constitutional
Issues, 116 S. AFR. L.J. 50, 53 (1999).
210. Abigail Harrison et al., Barriers to Implementing South Africa's Termination of Pregnancy Act
in Rural KwaZulu/Natal, 15 HEALTH POL'Y & PLAN. 424, 426-28 (2000).
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ment from their friends and families or disapproval from health practition-
ers.2 11 Women in turn are more likely to hide their terminations while they
seek out confidential or clandestine services.2 1 2
There are always anticipated difficulties in implementing or enforcing
new legislation when it challenges deeply held social beliefs or practices.
However, problems of reception intensify when legislative change fails to
account for the practical or contextual aspects of reform. This Part situates
post-enactment controversies as consequences of the legislative model pur-
sued. First, this Part looks at the uncertain and unsatisfactory standards
created by drafters' avoidance strategy-taking minors' access and con-
scientious objection as its primary examples-and reviews how practitioner
discretion or judicial and statutory interpretation now mediate debates about
the meaning and scope the CTOPA. Second, it seeks to understand the re-
source limitations that delay or prevent women from gaining access to abor-
tion services. This discussion suggests that a shortcoming of the CTOPA is
its incapacity to wrestle with the limitations of health care service delivery.
A. Refusals by Health Care Providers
The number of health professionals who refuse to assist women seeking
abortions has hampered the realization of CTOPA rights. 2 13 These profes-
sionals include nurses, physicians, midwives, and the "peripheral staff," like
managers and hospital superintendents, that act as "gatekeepers" to health
services. 214 For example, a 2002 study conducted in the Transkei region
showed that only 12.5% of practitioners were willing to perform an abortion
on request.215 Several studies note that most.health professionals are reluc-
tant to assist women seeking abortions because of their moral beliefs. 2 16
Health workers state in surveys that their role is to "save [lives,] not take
[them] away." 217 In a study conducted in 2000, seventeen percent of women
interviewed in three hospitals across Gauteng said that they understood
abortion was legal but chose another method of termination (for example,
211. Id. at 428-30.
212. Of 673 women interviewed in Gauteng, Mpumalanga, and the Western Cape provinces between
November 2001 and March 2002, thirty-three percent discussed their terminations with their sexual
partner and twenty-five percent with family members, while twenty-one percent did not discuss their
abortions with anyone. Diane Cooper et al., Medical Abortion: The Possibilities for Introduction in the
Public Sector in South Africa, REPROD. HEALTH MATTERS, Nov. 2005, at 35, 38-39 [hereinafter Cooper
et al., Medical Abortion].
213. Di McIntyre & Barbara Klugman, The Human Face of Decentralisation and Integration of
Health Services: Experience from South Africa, REPROD. HEALTH MATTERS, May 2003, at 108, 112-13.
214. SANJANI JANE VARKEY & SHARON FONN, How FAR ARE WE? ASSESSING THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF ABORTION SERVICES: A REVIEW OF LITERATURE AND WORK-IN-PROGRESS 8
(2000), available at http://www.hst.org.za/uploads/files/assabort.pdf; Blanchard et al., supra note 56, at
112.
215. G.A.B. Buga, Attitudes of Medical Students to Induced Abortion, 79 E. AFR. MED. J. 259, 262
(2002).
216. See Harrison et al., supra note 210, at 428-29; Sanjani Jane Varkey et al., The Role ofAdvocacy
in Implementing the South African Abortion Law, REPROD. HEALTH MATTERS, Nov. 2000, at 103, 105.
217. VARKEY & FONN, supra note 214, at 15.
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self-administered or outside of a medical facility) because they feared the
reaction of medical staff.2 18 Medical professionals with conscientious objec-
tions often refuse to refer women to professionals who might offer them
abortion care or to provide health services to women post-termination.2 19
Whether to include a refusal clause was a source of lively debate in the
drafting of the CTOPA. 22 0 A clause in an earlier draft would have allowed a
health care provider to refuse to treat a patient but required a referral to a
willing provider.2 2 1 The government later removed language from the bill
about refusal because reaching consensus proved too time-consuming and
met resistance from the Reproductive Rights Alliance.2 22 As a result, the
standard for refusal is unclear.
Section 15 of the Constitution provides for "the right to freedom of con-
science, religion, thought, belief and opinion." 22 3 Charles Ngwena notes that
providers could seek protection under the Constitution, which would subject
refusal rights to the limitations set out in Section 15 (rights to expression
must be consistent with other constitutional rights such as rights to repro-
ductive health and decision-making) 224 and the Constitution's general limi-
tations clause, Section 36.225 For Ngwena, Sections 15 and 36 read together
imply a balancing approach: providers would not have a right to object
when a termination is necessary to save a life or prevent serious damage to a
woman's health, could not refuse to provide information regarding where a
218. Rachel Jewkes et al., Why Are Women Still Aborting Outside Designated Facilities in Metro-
politan South Africa?, 112 BRIT. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNAECOLOGY 1236, 1240 (2005).
219. See Michelle C. Engelbrecht et al., The Implementation of the Choice on Termination of Preg-
nancy Act: Some Empirical Findings, 23 CURATIONIs 4, 6 (2000) (noting that health care workers ob-
struct abortion by refusing to give patients information about abortion services); Ngwena, Appraisal of
Abortion Law, supra note 6, at 715.
220. Note also that the 1975 Act included a conscience clause that allowed physicians to refuse to
perform an abortion. Haroz, supra note 6, at 881.
221. See Termination of Pregnancy Bill, 1996, Bill 80-96, § 8, available at http://us-
cdn.creamermedia.co.za/assets/articles/attachments/03832_termofpergb80-1996.pdf (last visited Sep-
tember 6, 2011). Ngwena argues that this form of refusal may still require health professionals to act
against their beliefs, potentially offending their right to freedom of religion and freedom of belief and
their right to be free from unfair religious discrimination. Ngwena, Conscientious Objection, supra note
164, at 11-14.
222. Ngwena reports that Parliament left out a refusal clause because it could not find a satisfying
balance between the health professional's right to expression and the woman's right to access health
services. Records of the debate indicate that drafters believed the interpretation of the Constitution could
mediate conflicts between the right to object and the right to health care. Ngwena, Conscientious Objec-
tion, supra note 164, at 14.
223. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, ch. 2, § 15(1).
224. Id. at § 15(3)(b) (stating that "[r]ecognition in terms of paragraph (a) must be consistent with
this section and the other provisions of the Constitution"); Ngwena, Conscientious Objection, supra note
164, at 9.
225. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, ch. 2, § 36(1) provides that rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited "to
the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on
human dignity, equality and freedom" and taking account of factors such as the nature, importance of the
right; the nature and extent of the limitation; the relation between the right and the limitation; and
whether the less restrictive limitation has been applied. See Ngwena, Conscientious Objection, supra
note 164, at I1.
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woman may seek termination, and could object only if they were involved
directly in performing the termination.226
Court decisions have not clarified the issue, although health profession-
als have asserted refusal rights. In a case yet resolved, a nurse refused to
prepare patients for follow-up treatment after terminations and her then-
director reassigned her to another department in the hospital. She sued the
hospital for unfair discrimination on the grounds of religion, conscience,
and belief under the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Dis-
crimination Act.227 Unsure whether the case presented an equality or em-
ployment issue, courts transferred the case to forums of differing jurisdic-
tion.228
Legislation subsequent to the CTOPA could have also clarified a stan-
dard for refusals. An amendment to the Health Professions Act addresses
ethical standards for medical professional conduct, such as obtaining in-
formed consent and record keeping.229 However, it avoids the issue of con-
scientious objection to abortion services.2 30
The lack of clarity makes for questionable health policy. It increases the
likelihood that health care providers will misunderstand what their legal
obligations are,231 which may in turn create a disincentive for medical pro-
fessionals to provide abortion care. 232 A 2006 study revealed that both sup-
portive and antagonistic physicians, nurses, and midwives were "not all that
familiar with the legislation" or "unclear about the conditions under which a
woman could request an abortion." 233 The extent to which the medical pro-
fession is unaware of the law is particularly troubling given that health pro-
fessionals exercise wide discretion in determining the validity of the
grounds for abortion in the second and third trimesters. They serve as the
226. Ngwena, Conscientious Objection, supra note 164, at 11 -15.
227. Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 (S. Aft.),
amended by the Judicial Matters Amendment Act 66 of 2008 (S. Afr.).
228. The plaintiff lodged her case in the Equality Court in 2004. Her case was transferred to the
Labor Court as a matter of constructive dismissal in 2005. In 2007, the Labor Appeals Court transferred
the case to the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration. Charles & Others v. Gauteng
Dept of Health (Kapanong Hosp.) & Others 2007 ZALAC 18 (S. Aft.). More recently, arbitration
helped reinstate a physician dismissed after participating in "protest action and campaigns against the
termination of pregnancies by the Free State health department." South African Press Association, Anti-
Abortion Doc Reinstated, NEWS24,COM, Mar. 8, 2010, http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Anti-
abortion-doc-reinstated-20100308 (but note that article incorrectly asserts that legislation governs health
professionals' refusals in the abortion context).
229. Ethical Rules of Conduct for Practitioners Registered Under the Health Professions Act, 1974:
Amendment (GN) R390/2008 (S. Afr.) available at http://www.info.gov.zalview/ DownloadFileAc-
tion?id 79654.
230. Id.
231. Ferdinand Van Oosten, The Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act: Some Comments, 16 S.
AFR. L.J. 60, 67-68 (1999).
232. Some health professionals have reported experiencing post-traumatic stress syndrome after
participating in abortion services, due in part from experiencing isolation or being denied promotion or
pay as a consequence of performing terminations. Ngwena, Conscientious Objection, supra note 164, at
4.
233. Jane Harries et al., Health Care Providers' Attitudes Towards Termination of Pregnancy: A
Qualitative Study in South Africa, 9 BMC PUBLIC HEALTH 296, 299 (2009).
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judges, for example, of patients' claims of physical, mental, or socio-
economic harm after twelve weeks of pregnancy.
At present, a provider has discretion to fill in the gaps of the CTOPA
with his or her own interpretation of the law. Considering, as the next Parts
do, that health care providers may be in need of further training and more
resources, the confusion or ignorance around their professional duties, com-
bined with opposition towards abortion generally, creates obstacles to im-
plementation that provisions of the CTOPA do not readily address. Still
unresolved is what role law should play in monitoring how providers serve
as gatekeepers to legal abortion services-mirroring contemporary debates
in the United States.2 34
B. Minors' Abortions and Parental Involvement
As with health care provider refusals, advocates did not avoid contro-
versy by omitting parental notice or consent requirements for minors' abor-
tions.235 During discussions over whether to include mandatory counseling
for minors (and whether some form of parental consent should be required),
advocates argued that any restriction on minors' choice would result in
young women using underground services outside the purview of parental
or public scrutiny.236 For example, the MRC study referenced in Part I
showed that adolescents were the population of women most likely to
present at hospitals with complications from illegal abortions before the
CTOPA.237 Even though the CTOPA gives minors the right to terminate
pregnancies without third-party permission, there is a significant reluctance
by providers to perform abortions on minors without prior parental approv-
al.238 Only thirteen percent of health professionals surveyed said minors
should be able to make independent abortion decisions and ninety-four per-
cent of social workers stated that the law should mandate that minors inform
their parents when terminating pregnancies.2 39
In Christian Lawyers II,240 plaintiffs before the Supreme Court of Ap-
peal argued that women under the age of eighteen were incapable of giving
informed consent, as defined by the CTOPA, without parental involve-
234. See supra note 193.
235. Political parties and anti-abortion organizations introduced amendments to restrict minors'
access during the 2004 and 2008 debates on the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Amendment Act.
See infra Part IV.C.
236. UN INT'L RESEARCH AND TRAINING INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF WOMEN, supra note 35,
at 215, 217 (noting the drafting Committee incorporated amendments regarding parental consent offered
by the Reproductive Rights Alliance and citing the to the Portfolio Committee on Health on the Termi-
nation of Pregnancy Bill by the Reproductive Rights Alliance).
237. Guttmacher, supra note 33, at 192 ("A closer inspection of the Medical Research Council data
shows that women under the age of 20 were three times more likely to present at a hospital with incom-
plete abortions than were older women.").
238. Sanjani Jane Varkey, Abortion Services in South Africa: Available Yet Not Accessible to All, 26
INT'L FAM. PLAN PERSP. 87, 88 (2000).
239. VARKEY & FONN, supra note 214, at 10.
240. Christian Lawyers II, supra note 179.
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ment.2 4 1 The court held that the capacity of a minor to give informed con-
sent should be determined by the mature minor standard developed by
common law: a minor "mature enough to form an intelligent will" may seek
health care without parental involvement.242 Medical professionals maintain
broad discretion to decide if a minor meets this standard of maturity. The
court stated:
Within the context of the Act, actual capacity to give informed con-
sent, as determined in each and every case by the medical practi-
tioner, based on the emotional and intellectual maturity of the indi-
vidual concerned and not on arbitrarily predetermined and inflexi-
ble age or fixed number of years, is the distinguishing line between
those who may access the option to terminate their pregnancies un-
assisted on the one hand and those who require assistance on the
other.243
If a minor lacks "emotional and intellectual maturity," then a health profes-
sional should refuse to perform the abortion.24 4
However, the decision does not offer guidance to medical professionals
for determining maturity. The court's reliance on the common law would
suggest that common law decisions would be informative on the point. But
as Joanna Erdman notes, the mature minor standard (as developed by com-
mon law) can be just as frustrating to a minor's agency as parental involve-
ment laws by requiring a health professional to judge a minor's abortion
decision.24 5 Erdman describes faulty assumptions that underpin decisional
oversight based on maturity.246 The first is that adolescents are incapable of
making any important decisions about their lives independently from adults,
which has been undermined by research on the cognitive development of
adolescents.2 47 The second, and perhaps more significant, assumption is that
third parties will improve the decision-making of minors.24 8 Erdman relies
on extensive literature to argue that because abortion decisions are individu-
241. Bekink & Bekink, supra note 16, at 22 (noting constitutional challenges based on rights to
family care and freedom from abuse or maltreatment).
242. Christian Lawyers H1, supra note 179, at 1094; see also Gillick v. W. Norfolk & Wisbech Area
Health Auth. [1985] 3 All E.R. 402 (H.L.) 403 (holding that medical practitioners may prescribe contra-
ceptives to minors without parental knowledge if the minor shows "sufficient understanding and intelli-
gence to ... understand fully what was proposed").
243. Christian Lawyers II, supra note 179, at 1094.
244. Id.
245. Joanna N. Erdman, Moral Authority in English and American Abortion Law, in CONSTITUTING
EQUALITY: GENDER EQUALITY AND COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 107, 110 (Susan Williams
ed., 2009).
246. Id. at 120-24.
247. See, e.g., Elizabeth Cauffman & Laurence Steinberg, The Cognitive and Affective Influences on
Adolescent Decision-Making, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1763, 1768 (1995) ("[M]ost studies indicate that there
are few, if any, differences between the cognitive processes of adults and adolescents.").
248. Id. at 1768-70.
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alized and context-driven, a third party rarely assesses the risks and benefits
better than the individual minor can. 24 9
Interestingly, Christian Lawyers II creates a maturity test that loosely
resembles the American standard for waiver of parental involvement. Under
U.S. parental involvement laws, a minor may waive notice to or consent
from a parent if a court-or in three states, a physician-finds that she is
either mature and well-informed or an abortion is in her best interests.250
The test affords courts wide discretion in determining maturity or best inter-
ests, and many state courts receive little to no guidance in determining ma-
251turity or best interests. Courts can, and do, systematically deny most or all
petitions heard or, conversely, grant almost all petitions.252 Arguably, health
professionals, like judges, could apply their discretion to the detriment of
minors if they believe most adolescents are immature. The Supreme Court
of Appeal addressed this possibility by stating blankly that medical practi-
tioners may not deny all minors an abortion because of their age.253 It is
unclear how courts would police this prohibition. Outside of an explicit age
requirement, a maturity test does not curb the provider's discretion in set-
ting too high a threshold for young women to evidence "emotional and in-
tellectual maturity." 254
The court could have considered other avenues for balancing the inter-
ests of minors, parents, and providers. The court highlighted minors' right
to reproductive decision-making in Section 12 of the Constitution, but did
not discuss how the constitutional rights of children in Section 28 (applying
255to persons under eighteen) might inform a mature minor standard. Section
28(2) states that "[a] child's best interests are of paramount importance in
every matter," which the Constitutional Court of South Africa has inter-
preted as a stand-alone and enforceable provision.2 56 The right to "family
249. Erdman, supra note 245, at 120-24.
250. Casey, in upholding Pennsylvania's parental consent statute, affirmed key aspects of the U.S.
Supreme Court's plurality decision in Bellotti v. Baird. In Bellotti, a plurality of the Court wrote that a
parent may not have an absolute veto of their child's abortion decision. If a minor does not want to
obtain parental consent-or cannot obtain parental consent-states must provide an alternative process
that allows the minor to show she is mature and well-informed or it is in her best interests to waive
parental consent. 443 U.S. 622, 643-44 (1979).
251. See, e.g., Rachel Rebouch6, Parental Involvement Laws and New Governance, 34 HARV. J.L. &
GENDER 175 (2011) (suggesting that the structure of parental involvement laws and the lack of training
on notice or consent laws deepen court discretion).
252. See Carol Sanger, Regulating Teenage Abortion in the United States: Politics and Policy, 18
INT'L J.L., POL'Y & FAM. 305, 309 (2004) ("Judges tend to fall into two categories: those who grant no
petitions, and those who rubber stamp most.").
253. Christian Lawyers II, supra note 179, at 1094.
254. Id. A 2009 report profiled by the World Health Organization highlights this problem. Nurses
resisted helping patients if they believed patients did not have good reasons for their abortions. DEP'T OF
REPROD. HEALTH AND RESEARCH, WORLD HEALTH ORG., WHAT HEALTH-CARE PROVIDERS SAY ON
PROVIDING ABORTION CARE IN CAPE TOWN, SOUTH AFRICA: FINDINGS FROM A QUALITATIVE STUDY 3
(2009) [hereinafter, WHO Report], available at http://whqlibdoc.who.int/ hq/2010/ WHORHR
HRP 10.18_eng.pdf.
255. Christian Lawyers II, supra note 179, at 1095-96.
256. Minister for Welfare and Population Development v. Fitzpatrick & Others 2000 (7) BCLR 713
(CC) at 720 (S. Afr.) (stating that section 28(2) "creates a right that is independent of those specified in
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care or parental care" in Section 28(l)(b) suggests that a child's right to
parental care derives from the Constitution's protection of the minor's well-
being rather than a parent's right to direct the upbringing of a child.257 This
interpretation is consistent with the decision of the Constitution's drafters to
omit references to the rights of parents or to the right to found a family.m
The best interest standard understood in this way could serve as a check on
providers' discretion.
Like refusals, subsequent legislative interventions related to minors'
consent to medical treatment have not necessarily clarified the standard. At
the time Christian Lawyers II was decided, the Child Care Act governed
parental consent for minors' medical treatment and surgical procedures. 25 9
Under the Act, any surgical procedure for a child under eighteen (and any
medical treatment for a child younger than fourteen) needed approval of a
guardian.2 60 This contradicted the CTOPA, which requires no such consent
for surgical abortion.261 In 2005, the Children's Act replaced the Child Care
Act and may have supplanted a mature minor standard, although not in
straightforward ways.262 Subject to the CTOPA, the Act permits a child to
consent to a surgical operation if she is over the age of twelve years and "is
of sufficient maturity and has the mental capacity to understand the benefits,
risks, social and other implications of the surgical operation."263 The Act
does not define who would make the maturity determination. The child also
must be "duly assisted by his or her parent or guardian." 26 4 "Assistance" is
not defined in legislation, but the Act appears to limit parental involvement
in so far that a parent may not refuse to assist the minor "by reason only of
religious or other beliefs, unless that parent or guardian can show that there
is a medically accepted alternative choice to the medical treatment or sur-
gical operation concerned." 2 65
The examples of refusals and parental involvement highlight how a fo-
cus on a woman's right to abortion may be necessary but not sufficient to
create the kind of access to services that drafters had in mind. These issues
touch on the complex role that intermediaries play in women's abortion
section 28(1)"); LS v. AT & Another 2001 (2) BCLR 152 (CC) at 162 (S. Afr.) (referring to section 28(2)
as "an expansive guarantee that a child's best interests are paramount in every matter concerning the
child").
257. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, ch. 2, § 28.
258. The South African Constitution does not explicitly protect parental rights. There is no right to
found a family and no provision that confers special status on the family unit, such as in other human
rights documents like the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights or the International Cove-
nant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. D. MARIANNE BLAIR & MERLE H. WEINER, FAMILY LAW
IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY: CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS IN COMPARATIVE AND
INTERNATIONAL FAMILY LAW 1139 (2003) (quoting Justice Albie Sachs about the decision of the Con-
stitution's drafters to exclude a right to found a family).
259. Child Care Act 74 of 1983 (S. Afr.); Van Oosten, supra note 231, at 71.
260. Bekink & Bekink, supra note 16, at 21.
261. CTOPA, supra note 4, § 5.
262. Children's Act 38 of 2005 (S. Afr.).
263. Id. §§ 129(1)-(3).
264. Id. § 129(3)(c).
265. Id. § 129(10).
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choices. The CTOPA succeeded in ensuring that legislative language did
not define the roles of third parties in relation to women, but it may not have
gone far enough in resolving conflicts between women's choices and the
interests of parents, providers, or others.
C. Logistical Obstacles to Health Care Services
The goal that reform strategies for additional abortion grounds presup-
pose is that legal abortion services, the access to which does not depend on
the woman's reason for termination or characteristics like age, will result in
greater access to abortion and will thus produce better health outcomes for
women. As noted, arguments for the CTOPA advanced research illustrating
how restrictions on legal abortion under the 1975 Act related to maternal
morbidity and mortality.266 Some women's health outcomes under the
CTOPA may look disconcertingly similar to those under the 1975 Act, be-
cause there remains a gap between those who have the necessary resources
to navigate obstacles to health care and those who do not.
Implementation problems would be predictable in any country, like
South Africa, where resource limitations are a substantial impediment to the
delivery of health care services. A broadly applicable right to abortion re-
quires more facilities and more health professionals to meet the increased
demand of a new population of women that can now seek legal abortions.
And because the CTOPA creates state responsibility to pay for abortion care
in public facilities, scarce resources are stretched even farther. 26 7
A decade after the CTOPA's enactment, only fifty-seven percent of
health facilities authorized to perform abortions actually did so. 2 68 The ma-
jority of abortions occur in or around South Africa's two largest cities, Jo-
hannesburg and Cape Town,269 and almost all of the designated facilities are
public hospitals,270 which are overwhelmed with patients and face severe
shortages of space and medical professionals. 271 Very few clinics provide
terminations in specialized settings independent from a hospital.272
Consolidation of services in urban areas exacerbates the considerable
delay in setting an appointment for an abortion.273 Given that the majority of
266. Guttmacher, supra note 33, at 192.
267. See National Health Act 61 of 2003 §4(3)(c) (S. Afr.) (reaffirming that terminations performed
at public facilities would be at no cost to women).
268. Bateman, supra note 11, at 302; see also WHO REPORT, supra note 254, at 4 (finding that
public sector facilities often did not have health professionals willing to perform abortions).
269. VARKEY & FONN, supra note 214, at 6; see also Elizabeth Clarke, Abortion Services in South
Africa, HEALTH SYSTEMS TRUST, http://www.hst.org.za/news/abortion-services-south-africa (last visited
Oct. 21, 2011).
270. Varkey, supra note 238, at 87. Jeremy Sarkin, writing before the passage of the CTOPA, argued
that hospital care is more costly to patients, results in greater delay, and lacks the equipment and profes-
sional specialization for delivering abortion services. Sarkin, Patriarchy and Discrimination, supra note
25, at 166-69.
271. McIntyre & Klugman, supra note 213, at 112.
272. VARKEY & FoNN, supra note 214, at 7.
273. Sarkin, Patriarchy and Discrimination, supra note 25, at 166-69.
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South Africans live in rural areas, 2 74 many women must travel considerable
distances to reach approved facilities, increasing the cost and time asso-
ciated with terminations.275 Access problems only become worse with delay
because, as a pregnancy develops, the CTOPA requires additional provider
oversight. 27 6 The nature of a trimester framework inevitably depends on
approval by providers of grounds for terminations in later pregnancy, which
assumes there are available health professionals for the task.
In an attempt to address the severe shortage of health care providers and
facilities, Parliament amended the CTOPA ("the Amendment") in 2004 to
allow all clinics or hospitals with twenty-four hour maternity wards to per-
form terminations, irrespective of whether the Minister of Health had ap-
proved the facility under the terms of the CTOPA. 27 7 The Amendment also
allows nurses who complete a Medical Controls Council (MCC) training
course to provide abortions.2 78 The Amendment quickly came under attack.
In Doctors for Life Int'l v. Speaker of the National Assembly & Others, peti-
tioners challenged the process of provincial consultation for the Amend-
ment. 27 9 The Constitutional Court held that the required consultation was
indeed lacking; the National Council of Provinces (NCOP) and the provin-
cial governments had failed to hold hearings on the Amendment in each
province.2 80 The Court suspended implementation of the Amendment for
eighteen months so that the NCOP could facilitate adequate public consulta-
tion among the provinces. 2 8 ' Having consulted through a number of the me-
chanisms noted in the Court's opinion,282 the Amendment returned to Par-
liament in 2008 without substantive changes and passed by 266 to 52
votes.283
Amendment debates provided a window into current public discourse
around abortion in South Africa. Political parties and anti-abortion organi-
zations introduced amendments to restrict minors' access under the CTOPA
284
and to require mandatory counseling, as well as to codify a conscience
clause for health care professionals.285 These proposals, although ultimately
unsuccessful, took precedence over discussions of resource allocation or
286logistical concerns about the CTOPA's implementation.
274. Higgins et al., supra note 45, at 1698.
275. See Haroz, supra note 6, at 891-92; see also Varkey, supra note 238, at 87.
276. See Sarkin, Patriarchy and Discrimination, supra note 25, at 166-69.
277. Cooper et al., Ten Years, supra note 35, at 76.
278. Id.
279. Doctors for Life Int'l v. Speaker of the National Assembly & Others 2006 (12) BCLR 1399 (CC)
(S. Afr.).
280. Id. 186.
281. Id. 214.
282. Id. % 132, 154.
283. Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Amendment Act 1 of 2008 (S. Afr.).
284. Siyabonga Mkhwanazi, One step closer for girls wanting abortions, lOL, Jan. 18, 2008,
http://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/one-step-closer-for-girls-wanting-abortions-1.386150.
285. Wyndham Hartley, South Africa: MPs Pass Abortion Bill By Due Date, ALLAFRICA.COM, Jan.
18, 2008, http://allafrica.com/stories/200801180289.html.
286. Abortion Bill Passed, HEALTH 24, Jan. 18, 2008, http://www.health24.com/news/HealthCare/1-
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Whether relaxing the CTOPA's centralized approach will help support
different avenues to abortion (such as through community-based clinics,
where many women seek other health care) is yet to be seen. Early reports
suggest that progress is slow. Citing one physician, a recent article in the
South African Medical Journal estimates that the CTOPA is implemented at
"30% of its potential efficacy." 28 7 Waiting lists and medical practitioner
refusals cause increased numbers of second trimester abortions, which, as
noted, put further strain on personnel, space, and services.28 8 The shortage
of resources has become so acute that health professionals are asking the
National Health Council to dispense the drug combination of misoprostol
and mifepristone so that women can self induce abortion at home with mi-
nimal medical supervision.289
In ways that the Amendment addressed indirectly, the CTOPA did not
have to rely so heavily on approval by the national health authority, the Mi-
nister of Health, in order to designate facilities for abortion services. It did
not have to restrict the type of medical professional that could perform what
should be a relatively low-risk procedure. And it could have drawn from the
resources already at the community level, such as traditional healers who
serve in roles like midwives. It might have intervened in building the coun-
try's health care infrastructure, but with women's reproductive health as a
centerpiece. The next Part presents a tentative suggestion for how to pursue
reform on somewhat different terms.
V. REFLECTIONS ON AN ALTERNATIVE LEGISLATIVE STRATEGY
The dominant model of reform may embed the very problems that it
seeks to circumvent, and may undermine an approach that would support
women's broader reproductive health needs. Reproductive health and rights
campaigns increasingly recognize that they must address problems in a
country's primary health care system. 29 0 The ICPD, for example, urges
states to ensure better service delivery and technical assistance at the level
918,43784.asp.
287. Bateman, supra note 11, at 304. Supporting this, a study conducted from 2008 to 2009 found
that health facilities met only a third of requests for abortion services in the Johannesburg area. J.F.
Mendes, D. Basu & J.K. Basu, Addressing the Demand for Termination of Pregnancy Services in Dis-
trict Health Facilities in Johannesburg, 100 S. AFR. MED. J. 614, 614 (2010).
288. Bateman, supra note 11, at 304 (noting a six week waiting list for services at a major Cape
Town hospital).
289. Id. at 302.
290. In some ways, health arguments have come full circle in abortion law reform, at least in the
United States. Reva Siegel notes that feminist interventions in the late 1960s, before Roe, sought to
reframe the discourse from "a question of public health" to concerns about women's equal citizenship.
Siegel, Roe's Roots, supra note 33, at 1881-82 ("Where the ALI model rationalized liberalization as
needed to protect women's health, the women's movement sought repeal of abortion laws to promote
women's equal standing as citizens."). Feminists mobilized people around the message of "'women
fighting for themselves' rather than "rescu[ing]" the woman with a troubled pregnancy. Greenhouse &
Siegel, supra note 118, at 2042 n.43 (quoting CHRISTINE STANSELL, THE FEMINIST PROMISE: 1792 TO
THE PRESENT 323 (2010)).
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of local and primary health care. 29 ' Activists and scholars alike call for
strategies that incorporate abortion into agendas to improve women's health
and, in particular, to reduce maternal morbidity and mortality.29 2 How legis-
lation might incorporate these concerns from the outset-in ways that make
use of existing power structures of import to communities-may not receive
sufficient attention during legislative or constitutional drafting processes.
In South Africa, for example, the CTOPA and the Amendment were di-
vorced from efforts to reform the country's primary health care system. The
government advanced a Primary Health Care Model in 1994 and the Patient
Rights Charter in 1997.293 Both the Model and the Charter focused on con-
crete proposals to consolidate primary health care services at regional levels
and to experiment with different delivery systems for preventive and pro-
motive health services.294
Reproductive health care remained marginalized in these initiatives.
Moreover, the government enacted policies for non-abortion reproductive
health services, like guidelines regulating access to contraceptives, funding
for cervical cancer screening, or provisions for antiretroviral drugs through
the public health system, in a piecemeal fashion that took longer to put in
place.295 A more recent example of the gap between health policy and abor-
tion law is the National Health Act of 2003, which emphasizes the devel-
opment of telemedicine to serve rural communities and to work with tradi-
tional healers in promoting a national health care agenda.9 Considering
that seventy percent of women report consulting traditional healers first,297
and over sixty percent of rural women were unaware that pregnancy termi-
nations were legal,298 proposals like those in the National Health Act would
have made sense for the CTOPA. But regulations issued on training for
health care providers (rural and urban) under the National Health Act do not
address abortion services. The general medical curriculum for primary care
health providers also does not include training and information on abortion
procedures or the optional, non-directive counseling before and after a ter-
mination.2 9 9
The CTOPA treats all issues of access the same-creating a right for
women based on non-discrimination and informed consent but not on the
291. ICPD, supra note 14, ch. 8.
292. R.J. Cook & C.G. Ngwena, Women's Access to Health Care: The Legal Framework, 94 INT'L J.
GYNECOLOGY & OBSTETRICS 216, 216-17 (2006).
293. Cooper et al., Ten Years, supra note 35, at 71-72.
294. Id. at 72.
295. Id. at 73-79.
296. Andy Gray & Caron Jack, Health Legislation and Policy, S. AFR. HEALTH REV. 31 (2008)
(citing National Health Act 61 of 2003 (S. Afr.)).
297. Meel & Kaswa, supra note 10, at 80.
298. Varkey, supra note 238, at 88 (noting that an early media campaign made people aware of the
CTOPA's existence, but not how it worked or what rights it conferred). In the Northern Cape, for exam-
ple, only fifty-five percent of respondents knew that abortion was legally available on request in the first
trimester and only twenty-four percent understood that the CTOPA does not require parental consent for
minors. VARKEY & FONN, supra note 214, at 12.
299. Varkey, supra note 238, at 87; see also Haroz, supra note 6, at 891.
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particular difficulties sub-populations of women have in seeking health
care. One change that shows promise is the introduction of medical abor-
tion. In 2001, five years after the passage of the CTOPA, the MCC ap-
proved terminations induced by the combination of hormones taken in pill
form for up to eight weeks of pregnancy. 300 The advantages were set out in
a 2005 study of the use of medical abortions in South Africa:301
Some women may prefer medical to surgical abortion to avoid in-
strumentation of the uterus. Medical abortion could also potentially
increase access in settings where providers are reluctant to provide
surgical abortion services. Health care workers may be less opposed
to a method of abortion that they do not have to initiate. Medical
methods may require less staff input. Provision of medical abortion
could increase women's options and broaden access to abortion ser-
*302vices.
Medical abortion could help overcome the current obstacles of stigma, con-
fidentiality, and lack of resources; however, medical abortion is rarely
used.303 Medical abortion is not available through public sector pharmacies,
and health professionals do not have the training they need under the
MCC's guidelines to administer it. 30 4 Traditional healers or their counter-
parts could monitor the use of medical abortion, a strategy that might tap
into the role many of those community figures play in women's reproduc-
tive decisions.305 Instead, women are increasingly taking drugs that induce
abortion, like misoprostol without mifepristone, often without sufficient
instruction on dosage, timing, or use.30 6
Of course, drafters cannot spell out every detail of a statute's implemen-
tation in the legislative text or predict all of the problems that might erupt.
But the CTOPA, as modem legislation shaped by a women's rights move-
300. "Medical abortion with 200mg mifepristone orally and 800mcg misoprostol vaginally may be
used up to nine weeks of pregnancy at home or in the clinic in the first trimester, and using a different
regimen, at the clinic in the second trimester of pregnancy. In 2001 the South African Medicines Control
Council approved a regimen of 600mg mifepristone and 400mcg misoprostol orally for medical abor-
tions up to eight weeks of pregnancy." Cooper et al., Medical Abortion, supra note 212, at 36.
301. Of those interviewed who had medical abortions, ninety-six percent of 289 women were satis-
fied or very satisfied with the experience. Three South African provinces found that ninety-three percent
of women had complete abortions using the mifepristone-misoprostol regimen. The "classic" regimen of
medical abortion shows that on average ninety-five percent of patients complete abortions. South Africa:
Mifepristone and Misoprotosal for Medical Abortion: A Brief Background, NAT'L ABORTION FED'N,
Feb. 27, 2006, http://www.prochoice.org/intemational/training/southafrica-mife.html.
302. Cooper et al., Medical Abortion, supra note 212, at 36.
303. Id. at 35-42.
304. Id. at 36.
305. This might not meet the concerns of medical abortion's cost, which is not yet free in public
sector facilities, or the costs of training traditional healers. Ipas, an international reproductive health
organization, estimates that the cost of medical abortion rose 75% in South Africa from 2002 to 2007.
IPAS, MISOPROSTOL AND MEDICAL ABORTION IN AFRICA 2 (2009), available at http://www.ipas.org/
Publications/asset upload file683_4512.pdf.
306. Jessica Cohen et al., Reaching Women with Instruction on Misoprostol Use in a Latin American
Country, REPROD. HEALTH MATTERS, Nov. 2005, at 84, 85.
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ment whose purpose was to advance women's health, may have missed an
opportunity to make connections between legal rights and practical access.
Nepal serves as an imperfect but useful counterexample. Reform
processes in countries other than South Africa share similarities in their
approaches to reproductive rights reform: liberalization or decriminalization
of laws governing abortion; intervention in political transition; reliance on
autonomy and equality norms from international documents like the ICPD
and FWCW; and predictable difficulties in implementing new laws that
place a demand on already limited public resources. Nepal, however, began
its campaign with a focus on creating access to health services through part-
nerships among the state, civil society, and international organizations. 3 07
In 2002, Nepal revised its abortion law in its legal code, or Muluki Ain,
after a twelve-year conflict and the drafting of a new constitution.308 Abor-
tion is legal for any reason during the first twelve weeks of pregnancy; up to
eighteen weeks if the pregnancy is the result of rape or incest; and at any
time with the advice of a medical practitioner if the life, physical or mental
health of the woman is at risk, or for fetal anomaly incompatible with life.309
For women under sixteen, a "guardian" must give consent, which can in-
clude any adult friend or family member. 3 10 The former law banned abortion
entirely, even if the pregnancy was "the result of rape or incest or threatened
the woman's life."3 1 1 Unlike South Africa, the state prosecuted women who
had abortions. At one point, individuals jailed for having abortions were
over one-fifth of the women's prison population.3 12
The advocacy effort in Nepal was complex. Beginning in the 1970s, ad-
vocates and legislators lobbied for reform with the assistance of American
and Western European NGOs. 3 13 Drawing strength from the global move-
ment for reproductive rights, a then-newly established constitutional mo-
narchy took responsibility for Nepal's "Safe Motherhood Network," which
received technical assistance from the World Health Organization. 3 14 In
addition to the democratization of Nepal's political system and growing
acceptance of international law, advocates gathered empirical evidence of
the number of women harmed from illegal abortion."'1 One pre-
307. Shyam Thapa, Abortion Law in Nepal: The Road to Reform, REPROD. HEALTH MATTERS, Nov.
2004, at 85, 86-88.
308. Id. at 91.
309. NEPAL RAJ PATRA (OFFICIAL GAZETTE), pt. 52, Additional issue 47, pt. 2, Sept. 26, 2002, at
22-23.
310. Id.
311. Thapa, supra note 307, at 85.
312. Id at 89; see also Cook & Dickens, supra note 72, at 31-32 (noting increased support for abor-
tion law liberalization after a fifteen-year-old rape victim was imprisoned for illegal abortion-a termi-
nation her family forced her to have).
313. Ganga Shakya et al., Abortion Law Reform in Nepal: Women's Right to Life and Health,
REPROD. HEALTH MATTERS, Nov. 2004, at 75, 79.
314. Thapa, supra note 307, at 86-87. The World Health Organization launched its global Safe
Motherhood Network initiative in 1987.
315. Id at 88-89.
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liberalization study estimates that fifty percent of maternal deaths were due
to abortion-related complications. 16
The first bill introduced to decriminalize abortion failed when its spon-
sor's term of office ended.3 17 The second attempt to change the abortion
law, in 1997, was part of a larger legislative strategy to remove gender dis-
crimination in property ownership, inheritance law, divorce and marriage
laws, and in criminal statutes governing rape. 318 After five years of debate,
the legislature passed the 11th Amendment Bill to the Legal Code in
2002.3 19 Almost two years after passage, the legislature approved the Proce-
dural Order necessary to give the law effect.3 2 0
Drafting policy guidelines to implement abortion access took six
months. 3 2 1 The guidelines set out objectives for changing negative attitudes
toward abortion, increasing government funding for abortion services, and
reducing "health system barriers." 3 22 Related to the third objective, the Na-
tional Safe Abortion Directive provides for the training of providers, includ-
ing nurses and midwives. 323 Much of this training occurred with the assis-
tance of international NGOs and, like South Africa, a coalition of national
advocates who successfully collaborated with government. 32 4
Also similar to the South African experience, proponents of change re-
lied on international human rights and research illustrating the impact of
illegal abortion on women's health to make the case for liberalization.
However, a key difference between Nepal and South Africa is that reform-
ists in South Africa began with media and messaging campaigns-their
focus post-enactment was to change the attitudes of people about the con-
nection between abortion and women's rights. Conversely, Nepal's advo-
cates pressed first for government issued guidelines on timely services,
325access to medical abortion, and training for physicians and nurses. For
example, Nepal's reform movement began with calls for the training of
health professionals across the country and for including abortion care as
part of the primary health care curriculum. 32 6 Moreover, advocates concen-
316. Id. at 89. As noted, a characteristic of Nepal's past system of abortion regulation that attracted a
lot of media attention was that police frequently arrested and jailed women for abortion offenses. The
due process rights of these women, who were often prosecuted under the abortion statute even if they
had miscarried, gave the campaign for liberalization an added, salient human rights dimension. Shakya
et al., supra note 313, at 76.
317. Thapa, supra note 307, at 90.
318. Id.
319. Id. at 90-91.
320. Shakya et al., supra note 313, at 79.
321. Id.
322. Id. at 80.
323. Amit Bhandari et al., Experiences of Abortion in Nepal and Menstrual Regulation in Bangla-
desh: A Gender Analysis, 16 GENDER & DEV. 257, 267 (2008) (discussing the need for expedited policy
decisions to allow for the training of providers); CTR. FOR REPROD. RIGHTS, WOMEN OF THE WORLD:
LAWS AND POLICIES AFFECTING THEIR REPRODUCTIVE LIVES - SOUTH ASIA 115 (2004), available at
http://reproductiverights.org/sites/crr.civicactions.net/files/documents/pdf wowsa nepal.pdf.
324. Shakya et al., supra note 313, at 81.
325. See Thapa, supra note 307.
326. Shakya et al., supra note 313, at 80.
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trated on expanding services at the local level by adopting a community-
centered approach.327
Contrasting legislative strategies is not to suggest that abortion access in
Nepal is unencumbered. Unlike South Africa, the public health sector does
not offer free abortion services. Litigation has helped secure state funding
for some women with financial need. In 2009, the Supreme Court of Nepal
held that the government had the duty to subsidize terminations for low-
income, rural women. 32 8 But there is still a need to expand services for
329many Nepalese women.32 Most legal abortion providers are in urban areas
in primary health care centers or district hospitals, 330 while eighty-eight
percent of the population lives in rural Nepal. 33 1 Informational deficits also
remain. For example, many women still believe spousal permission is re-
quired 33 2 or resort to illegal abortions because of negative societal attitudes
towards abortion and shortages of accessible, confidential medical servic-
es.333
Despite these shortcomings, it would appear that abortion is accessible
to a wider range of Nepalese women than South African women.3 34 Intui-
tively, this should not be the case: grounds for abortion in Nepal are not as
expansive as they are in South Africa. More women qualify for legal abor-
tion in Johannesburg than in Kathmandu, so, in theory, more South Africans
should have access to abortion procedures. The priorities of legal reform
shape the resulting availability of services-whether legislation defends
against future attacks on women's legal rights or whether it concentrates on
reducing "system barriers." 335
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this Article is to suggest how dominant thinking around
reproductive rights, perhaps effective in transplanting priorities salient in
U.S. abortion jurisprudence, could include approaches tailored to health
care delivery at the beginning of reform projects, when advocates have in-
fluence in times of political change. Changing a country's health care infra-
structure or attitudes about abortion does not happen quickly or easily. Ne-
gotiating new understandings of medical professional ethics and principles
327. Id. at 75.
328. Kathambi Kinoti, Nepal Government Directed to Make Abortion Accessible, AWID (July 8,
2009, 4:38 AM), http://awid.org/Library/Nepal-government-directed-to-make-abortion-accessible/.
329. Shakya et al, supra note 313, at 77.
330. Bhandari et al., supra note 323, at 258.
331. Shakya et al., supra note 313, at 75-77.
332. Bhandari et al., supra note 323, at 261.
333. Id at 259. State officials also need more education and training on the new law: a few Nepalese
women have been arrested for having abortions despite the procedure's legalization. Shakya et al., supra
note 313, at 82.
334. Mallika Aryal, Health-Nepal: On Course to Achieve MDG on Maternal Health, INTERPRESS
SERV., Jan. 13, 2009, http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews-45387.
335. Shakya et al., supra note 313, at 80.
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of parental control, for example, are nuanced tasks for any society. Creating
space in health care facilities and training medical practitioners requires
substantial funding, will, and time.
Yet in moments of transition, such as the one that occurred in South
Africa at the end of apartheid, reformists have a limited window to pursue
change that reconfigures the institutions of governance. This Article chal-
lenges a model of reproductive rights advocacy that may prove too reactive
and not sufficiently responsive to the particularities of a nation's health care
system or the social context that shapes the law's implementation. South
African supporters of abortion rights now spend considerable energy fight-
ing controversies they aimed to avoid in the first place. One reason may be
that the template readily available to those promoting reproductive health
rights and increased access to termination services is often fixated on de-
criminalization and liberalization of abortion law to the exclusion of related
health care issues. This critique can strengthen the assumptions that under-
pin modern reproductive rights movements: abortion is not the sole goal of
reformers, who also pursue policies supporting pre-natal health care, access
to contraceptives, and prevention and treatment of sexually transmitted in-
fections, for example; unsafe and illegal abortion can have profoundly
harmful health consequences for women; and successful implementation of
a new abortion law depends not only on availability of services, but also on
changing attitudes toward women's procreative roles.
Aspects of the current model, however, undermine practical strategies
that could ultimately help accomplish the goal of improving women's
health. There may be room for compromises or creative solutions that
would not be possible or wise in countries like the United States. Perhaps
one way to reconfigure the conversation is to concentrate less on what out-
comes legislation should avoid and more on the particularized problems that
accompany creating or restructuring health care services.
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